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This dissertation consists of three essays which investigate individuals’ interaction in different 
contexts using social network analysis.  The first essay generalizes the models of link formation 
of Rogers (2005) by allowing that giving and asking choices can be made separately and 
simultaneously by each agent.  We focus on two specifications of the relationship function: the 
concave specification and the linear specification.  The second essay empirically tests how the 
pattern of village structure, in terms of lineage network composition, affects people’s reciprocal 
behavior, utilizing data from Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002.  The third essay 
demonstrates different types of asymmetries and investigates individuals’ behavior in a model of 
friendship networks based on Brueckner (2006). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A social network describes a group of individuals, and the relations between them.  Relations, 
often depicted as links, are means for communication and for allocation of goods and services, 
such as invitations, information, friendship, opportunities and the like (Jackson and Wolinsky, 
1996).  The pattern of individuals’ interaction, which is embedded in a social network, plays a 
key role in shaping economic outcomes and thus has broad implications.  This promotes both 
theoretical and empirical analysis of social networks.  Existing literature provides extensive 
research across a wide range of subjects such as hyperlinks between webpages, political alliance, 
job hunting in labor markets, research collaboration among firms, and provision of public goods 
(Newman and Girvan, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Rees, 1966; Baker, Murphy and Gibbons, 2004; 
Bramoulle and Kranton, 2007). 
        In a network, establishing and maintaining the relations take time and effort.  How to 
allocate resources across different relations is then a fundamental question, such as how to spend 
limited effort in obtaining information from others, how to spend limited time in helping each 
other or how to spend a limited budget in building public goods.  Once the relation is created, 
individuals can exchange information or favor through the relations.  A social network analysis 
aims at investigating in different contexts what kind of relation structure will emerge and what 
the economic effects of the pattern of relations will be.  
        The presence of social networks or communities may enforce a set of norms or behaviors, 
such as altruism, cooperation and trust.  Putnam (1999) defined this set of norms or behaviors as 
social capital — “features of social life, networks, norm, trust that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.”  Recent literature relates social capital 
with community heterogeneity.  For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) illustrate a negative 
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relationship between racial fragmentation and trust, a major component of social capital.  Leigh 
(2006) finds the same relationship between ethnic fragmentation and trust.  Some studies also 
argue that ethnic fragmentation is inversely related with public-good provision (Banerjee et al., 
2005; Alesina et al., 1999).  Thus, social network pattern may affect individuals’ interaction and 
building of social capital.   
        These important questions stated above motivate my research.  This dissertation, presented 
in the following chapters, investigates individuals’ interaction in different contexts using social 
network analysis.  The second chapter of my dissertation studies network formation in a model 
of asking and giving, where the amount of benefits individuals obtain from their connections 
depends on those agents’ effort in asking as well as their connections’ effort in giving.  To 
further explore the relationship between social networks and individuals’ behavior, the third 
chapter empirically tests how the pattern of village structure in China, in terms of lineage 
network composition, affects people’s reciprocal behavior.  Examples of reciprocal behavior 
include helping each other, borrowing and lending, or public-good provision.  The last chapter 
analyzes a special type of networks — friendship network.  We introduce different types of 
asymmetries and investigate individuals’ behavior in a model of friendship networks based on 
Brueckner (2006).    
1.1 Network formation in a model of asking and giving 
People derive benefits from connecting with each other.  These benefits may be pleasure, 
information, favors and so on.  The second chapter of this dissertation studies network formation 
in a model of asking and giving.  This model builds on the model of asking and the model of 
giving introduced by Rogers (2005).  Rogers examines the behavior of asking and giving in 
separate models and claims that inefficiency comes from the behavior of giving.  We generalize 
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Rogers’ models by incorporating two decisions – asking and giving – into one model.  More 
importantly, by considering asking behavior and giving behavior at the same time, we provide a 
new perspective into some aspects that cannot be obtained in separate models, i.e., the 
relationship between asking behavior and giving behavior.   
        We assume in the network each individual is endowed with an intrinsic value and this value 
is publicly observed.  Each individual has a budget constraint which implies a limited amount of 
resources spent on obtaining information from others.  Apart from one’s own intrinsic value, an 
individual also wants to get some information from others.  So people have to decide whom to 
connect with and how much effort to spend in establishing the relationships.  Once the 
relationship is established between two individuals, information naturally flows from one to the 
other.  The amount of information the other agent gets depends on the nature of the relationship, 
which is represented by a relationship quality function.  The relationship quality function has two 
arguments: the effort of asking information and the effort of giving information.  For example, 
the share of information flowing from agent j to agent  depends on agent ’s effort in asking as 
well as agent ’s effort in giving.  This chapter aims at studying under different assumptions how 
agents behave when they face the decisions of both asking and giving and how the socially 
optimal network structure would respond. 
        This model contributes to the literature by assuming the amount of information one confers 
to other agents is endogenously determined by the network structure.  This reasonable 
assumption leads to several important characteristics.  First, all paths between two agents 
generate benefits.  Second, we take “feedback effects” into account, whereby the benefits 
associated with a relationship are counted many times.  Feedback effects appear frequently in 
daily life and have important implications.   
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1.2 Lineage-based fragmentation and cooperative behavior in rural China 
In less developed areas, formal institutions are often missing or weak.  Hence, in situations when 
information asymmetries are crucial, informal institutions instead play an important role.  In 
rural China, many villages are still structured by a number of traditional lineage organizations, 
which results in lineage-based fragmentation.   
Using data from the Chinese Household Income Project Survey (CHIPS) 2002, we define 
three types of villages: types 1-3, which go from the most homogenous to the most 
heterogeneous villages.  We then measure intra-lineage cooperation by the frequency of mutual 
help within a lineage.  Two kinds of mutual help are considered: monetary help and non-
monetary help that is time-consuming.  Inter-lineage cooperation is measured by villagers’ 
physical contribution to public goods and the share of village budget spent on public goods.  This 
chapter aims at examining how lineage-based fragmentation affects cooperative behavior in rural 
China. 
This study is novel for three reasons.  First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that presents a full picture of cooperative behavior by examining both intra-group and 
inter-group cooperation.  Second, since both the provision of public goods in rural China and 
fragmentation are measured at the village level, our study presents a more convincing 
relationship between the two variables than some existing literature does.  Third, China serves as 
an excellent case for studying fractionalization because the lineage composition within a village 
is exogenously determined.   
1.3 Asymmetries in friendship networks 
The fourth chapter of this dissertation considers a model of friendship networks based on 
Brueckner (2006) where costly links with an uncertain success probability yield direct and 
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indirect benefits.  We first study cost asymmetries by allowing for an agent with lowest linking 
costs called the cost-magnetic agent.  Next we focus on network asymmetries by allowing for a 
knows-everyone agent.  We characterize the equilibrium effort levels for both cases for the class 
of regular networks.  We also show that this cannot be done for arbitrary networks. 
This work extends the work of Brueckner (2006) by introducing different types of 
asymmetries in the model of friendship networks.  Given the model setup, asymmetries can 
occur either in values or costs, or in the network structure itself.  Brueckner himself proposes 
value based asymmetry and network asymmetry but considers only specific examples for both 
types.  In the real world, there is yet another type of asymmetry.  With the same level of effort, 
the cost of forming friendships is less for certain individuals but high for many others.  This idea 
motivates the analysis of cost based asymmetry.  Since Roy and Sarangi (2009) have already 
examined value based asymmetry, in this chapter we first introduce cost based asymmetry and 
then focus on network asymmetry.  Unlike Brueckner (2006) where asymmetries are examined 
only for very small sets of agents, for both instances we consider the general case with  agents. 
The examination of asymmetries is important for two reasons.  First, most economic 
environments are not characterized by homogeneous agents.  Second, they act as a robustness 
check for results obtained in the homogenous model.  Thus, the present extensions could benefit 
both decisions makers and researchers in important areas when they face different occasions.
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The process of strategic network formation has broad implications ranging from interactions 
among different individuals, firms and also websites.  People derive benefits from connecting 
with each other.  These benefits may be pleasure, information, favors and so on.  The goal of this 
paper is to study a model of network formation in which the amount of benefits agents obtain 
from their connections depends on those agents’ effort in asking as well as their connections’ 
effort in giving.   
        In an effort to fix ideas, we interpret benefits as information throughout this paper. We 
consider the following problem in which each individual in the network is endowed with an 
intrinsic value and this value is publicly observed.  For example, we know doctors know 
medicine and engineers know engineering.  Each individual has a budget constraint which 
implies a limited amount of resources spent on obtaining information from others.  Apart from 
one’s own intrinsic value, an individual also wants to get some information from others.  So 
people have to decide whom to connect with and how much effort to spend in establishing the 
relationships.  Once the relationship is established between two individuals, information 
naturally flows from one to the other.  The amount of information the other agent gets depends 
on the nature of the relationship, which is represented by a relationship quality function.  The 
relationship quality function has two arguments: the effort of asking information and the effort of 
giving information.  For example, the share of information flowing from agent j to agent  
depends on agent ’s effort in asking as well as agent ’s effort in giving.   
7 
 
        The utility of each individual is regarded as the total amount of information this individual 
has.  We describe it as the sum of one’s intrinsic value and the amount of information one gets 
from the connections to other agents.  The amount of information one obtains from a connection 
is quantified by the product of the relationship quality function and the total amount of 
information the connection has.  Thus, the information agents have also depends on who their 
connections are.  Utilizing this setup, this paper aims at studying how agents behave when they 
face the decisions of both asking and giving and how the socially optimal network structure 
would respond. 
        The model of asking and giving investigated in this paper benefits from Rogers (2005). 
Rogers examines the behavior of asking and giving in separate models and claims that 
inefficiency comes from the behavior of giving.  In the model of asking, agents receive 
information through the relationships they establish while in the model of giving, agents confer 
information through the relationships.  In the real world, however, interaction between two 
agents often exhibits not only their effort spent in asking but also their effort in giving.  It is not 
necessary to separate asking behavior from giving behavior.  Thus, this work generalizes Rogers’ 
models by incorporating two decisions – asking and giving – into one model.  More importantly, 
by considering asking behavior and giving behavior at the same time, this paper provides a new 
perspective into some aspects that cannot be obtained in separate models, i.e., the relationship 
between asking behavior and giving behavior.   
        Much of the literature is based on the assumption that the information one obtains from the 
connections is exogenously determined (Block and Dutta, 2005; Brueckner, 2006; Jackson and 
Rogers, 2005; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).  However, Rogers’ models contribute to the 
literature by assuming the amount of information one confers to other agents is endogenously 
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determined by the network structure.  In other words, what a person can offer depends on who 
his/her acquaintances are.  For example, what teachers can teach depends on their own 
knowledge as well as the knowledge they learn from their friends, colleagues and so on.  This 
reasonable assumption leads to several important characteristics.  First, all paths between two 
agents generate benefits.  There is limited work in the literature considering redundancy.  For 
instance, in the connection model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the benefit one agent gets 
from another only depends on the number of links in the shortest path between them.  However, 
other paths may also generate added value.  Second, we take “feedback effects” into account, 
whereby the benefits associated with a relationship are counted many times.  Feedback effects 
appear frequently in daily life and have important implications.  A simple example is two 
students working on a problem.  While they discuss with each other and exchange information, 
the effort one student devotes in conveying information to the other benefits both of them.  They 
can keep exchanging their new thoughts until finally the problem is solved.  On the contrary, the 
friendship network introduced by Brueckner (2006) considers only the benefits from all direct 
and indirect friends but ignores feedback effects. 
        The analysis of network formation in this paper is based on the approach proposed by Bala 
and Goyal (2000) – using the concept of Nash network.  In their study, the costs and benefits of 
links are exogenously given.  Bloch and Dutta (2009) then study a network in which the quality 
of links is endogenously chosen by the agents.  Our study differs fundamentally from their work 
in two ways.  First, the network they analyze is a two-way flow network where both parties at 
two sides of the link share the same link quality.  However, the model of asking and giving is a 
one-way flow network and the flow of information is directed.  Second, the utility in their work 
is modeled as the link strength of the shortest path between two agents.  In this paper, we use a 
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different utility structure: one’s utility is the sum of intrinsic value and the information obtained 
from all connections.  
        Different assumptions can be made on the relationship quality function.  Following Rogers’ 
study, we model the relationship quality function under two specifications: the concave 
specification and the linear specification.  Under the concave specification, the relationship 
quality function is concave.  We find that people spend more effort in asking for help from those 
with more information, and spend more effort in offering information to those from whom they 
can receive more information.  A social planner would want people to spend more effort in 
giving if they have better relationships with others.  Another finding is related to the relationship 
between asking behavior and giving behavior.  If an agent benefits less from receiving 
information than his/her connection does, then this agent’s effort in asking information from this 
connection is increasing with the effort in giving information to this connection. 
        Under the linear specification, the relationship quality function is linear.  With this 
assumption, people only spend effort in asking information.  To make the model tractable, we 
consider a simple network with only three agents.  Following Brueckner (2006), we introduce 
asymmetries into the network by considering an endowment-attractive case and a budget-
attractive case.  In both cases, there is an attractive agent while the other two are identical.  The 
attractive agent may either have higher intrinsic quality (endowment-attractive) or more budget 
to spend (budget-attractive).  Although this setup may appear simple, it has some interesting 
implications.  We find in both cases, non-attractive agents spend all their resources connecting 
with the attractive agents.  This is consistent with the finding of Breuckner (2006).  Moreover, in 
both cases, efficient networks coincide with Nash network.   
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        The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we set up the model.  Section 3 
discusses the results.  The last section summarizes and concludes our findings.  
2.2  Model setup 
Since this analysis is based on the two models initiated by Rogers (2005), we adopt the notation 
used in his paper.  There is a finite set of agents 	 = 	 {1, . . . , }, which are identified with nodes 
of a network .  A network is a collection of nodes and links which represent the network 
relations among agents.  Suppose agents are endowed with intrinsic values 	 = 	 ( 	, . . . , 	) 	 ∈
 and budgets 	 = 	 ( 	, . . . , ) ∈ .  This setting introduces heterogeneity and can be 
interpreted as each individual in the society holds a certain amount of information and his 
resources such as time and money are limited.  People know how much and what kind of 
information they can get from those with different professions.  Moreover, resources like wages 
for different jobs are available on the internet.  As a result, it is reasonable to assume further that 
agents’ qualities and budgets are publicly observed.  Individuals obtain information from others 
at the expenses of their resources.  Thus, agents have to decide how to allocate their limited 
resources β in establishing relationships with others.  We assume agents have two ways to spend 
their effort: asking for information from others and giving information to others.  Formally,  
is the amount of resources agent  spends on asking information from  and 	is the resources 	spends on giving information to 	 .  Each agent  has strategies = ( , . . . , ) and =, . . . ,  that satisfy	 = + = 0, = + ≥ 0		for	all i, j	∈ . The budget 
constraint ∑ ≤ 	for all ∈ .   represents the allocation of resources spent on asking 
information from others while represents the allocation of resources used for giving 
information to others.  = 0, implying that agents know their own quality and they do not 
need to ask information from themselves.   
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        Once the relationship is established between two individuals, information flows from one to 
the other.  The amount of information the other agent gets depends on a relationship quality 
function.  The relationship quality function has two arguments: one agent’s effort in giving 
information as well as the other agent’s effort in asking information.  Formally, the share of 
information flowing from agent  to 	is modeled as the relationship quality function, ( ,), which satisfies 0 ≤ < 1, and is strictly increasing in both arguments.   
        We define agent  to be directly connected to agent  if there is a link directed from 	to  in 
a network , or , > 0.  In such case, the link is denoted	 .  Agent  is agent ’s direct 
neighbor if agent 	is directly connected to agent .  Figure 2.1 below describes the flows of 
information between two agents,  and , if they are directly connected to each other.  The upper 
arrow pointing to agent  from agent  represents the link , indicating that agent  is directly 
connected to agent	 .  The lower arrow, reversely, represents link , showing that agent	  is 
directly connected to agent .  The share of information flowing from agent j to agent  is , .  Thus, there may exist two links between two agents as shown in the figure below.  
If , = 0, then there is no link or no flow of information from 	to .   
        The network  is a complete network if every agent ∈ , is directly connected to every 
other agent ∈ \{ }.  A path in  connecting agent  and  is a sequence of distinct nodes { , , … , } and directed links { , , … , } in the network .  The distance from  to 
, denoted ( , ), is then the minimum number of links among all the possible paths existing 
between agent  and .  So the distance between direct neighbors is 1.  If the distance from 
agent 	to  is greater than 1, then we define agent  as agent ’s indirect neighbor which means 
agent 	is indirectly connected to agent  .  
12 
 
                                
Figure 2.1: The flows of information         
        Different assumptions can be made on the relationship quality function ( , ). 
Throughout this paper, relationship quality is assumed to be an additively separable function of 
investments, i.e., ( , ) = ℎ ( ) + ℎ ( ).  So the effort in asking and the effort in 
giving are assumed to be substitutes.  With endogenous relationship quality, agents are able to 
adjust their decisions for resources allocation.  We focus on two specifications of relationship 
quality.  In the first case, each separable function is concave, which indicates diminishing returns 
to investment in establishing a link.  This assumption is reasonable since, for example, at a low 
level of effort, it is easy for an agent to get some basic information from partners but after that it 
becomes increasingly harder to gain additional information.  In the second case, the relationship 
quality function is linear.  The effort in asking and the effort in giving are assumed to be perfect 
substitutes.  A formal description of the two specifications is stated as follows: 
Assumption 2.1 (Concave specification): ℎ (⋅)	 	ℎ (⋅) are continuously differentiable, 
strictly increasing, and strictly concave, ℎ (0) = ℎ (0) = 0 and ℎ (⋅) + 	ℎ (⋅) < 	1so that ∈[0,1).  Also, → ℎ ( ) = ∞, and → ℎ ( ) = ∞.	  
Assumption 2.2 (Linear specification):  The functions ℎ (⋅)	 	ℎ (⋅) are both the identity 
mapping.  In this case, ∈ 0, 	 	 ℎ 		 ( , ) = + ∈ [0,1).   
        Total utility of agent  is defined as the sum of ′s intrinsic value and the information 
derived through ′s direct neighbors via the network structure.  Let  denote the total utility of 
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agent ,  the information derived from direct neighbors so that 	= 	 	+	 .  If agent  is 
directly connected to agent , then ( , ) of agent ’s information flows to agent  through 
the link .  In other words, we get ( , ) as the amount of information agent  obtains 
from agent .  Since 	= 	 	+	 , we rewrite ( , ) as ( + ) ( , ), and then 
sum up all information from direct neighbors to obtain 	 = ∑ ( + ) ( , ).  Therefore, 
the total information of agent  from a network  is given by, = + = + ( + ) ( , ) 
where the first term is agent i’s intrinsic value, and the second term is the information i gets from 
direct neighbors.  
        Collecting the above equations in matrix notation we obtain = + ( ) , where =( , . . . , )  and = ( , . . . , )  are column vectors of utilities and intrinsic values 
respectively.  ( ) denotes the matrix with elements ( , ), i.e., ( ) is the network 
structure generated by strategy profile = [( , )].  Solving for	  yields =(1 − ( )) .  Letting = (1 − ( ))  with elements , we have = 	 .  The matrix 
 can be rewritten as ∑ ( )  since − ( ) satisfies the well-known dominant diagonal 
condition.  Thus, ( ( ) ) 	 depicts the total weight of directed paths from  to  that have 
length .   represents the total weight of all paths from	  to .  Also, since ∈ [0,1), the 
matrix A is convergent. 
        Another object in the study of networks is to examine the total value of a network.  The 
total value in this paper is defined as the sum of individual utilities, ( ) = ∑ ( ).  Next we 
proceed to define Nash networks and efficient networks. 
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Definition 2.1 A strategy profile ∗( ) is said to be a best response of agent i against the 
strategy ( ) if ∗( ), 	 ( ) ≥ ( ), 	 ( ) , for all ( ).   
Definition 2.2 A network  is a Nash network if the strategy for each agent in the network is a 
best response.   
        So in a Nash network, agents maximize their own utilities, given other agents’ strategies.  
Agents have no incentive to deviate from their equilibrium behavior.   
Definition 2.3 A network  is efficient if ( ) ≥ ( ′) for all possible structure ′.   
        An efficient network has the highest total value among all possible network structures.  
2.3   Results 
In this section we state our main results.  Subsection 3.1 investigates the concave specification.  
We first characterize the equilibrium and efficient network under the concave specification.  
Then we study the relationship between agents’ asking behavior and giving behavior.  In 
Subsection 3.2, we look at the linear case.  To make the model tractable, we follow Brueckner 
(2006) by introducing asymmetries into a network with only three agents.  
2.3.1   Concave specification 
In the model of giving from Rogers (2005), there are many Nash networks that are not complete.  
For example, if there is no link pointing to agent  from , then  has no incentive to give any 
information to  for reason that agent  cannot obtain any benefits from doing so.  In other words, 
agent  and agent  stay in different partitions.  But this is not true when we incorporate the 
behavior of asking into the model.  Now we characterize the set of Nash networks and the 
efficient networks and provide some intuition for the results.  The formal proofs are given in the 
Appendix.  The first proposition describes the Nash networks under the concave specification. 
15 
 
Proposition 2.1 Under the concave specification, the Nash network is complete, which satisfies 
the conditions ∑ = 	 	 	 ∈ , 	for all , , ’ ∈  
ℎ = ℎ ,												(2.1) 
ℎ = ℎ 									(2.2) 
Proof  See Appendix. ∎ 
         The assumptions of lim→ ℎ ( ) = ∞ and lim→ ℎ ( ) = ∞	ensure that the Nash network is 
complete.  The marginal return is relatively high at a low level of investment.  So it is beneficial 
for every agent to spare some effort interacting with every other agent.  Then the solution of the 
utility maximization problem for every agent is interior.  First order conditions lead to equation 
(2.1) and (2.2).  Marginal utilities are equal across different links.  Otherwise, agents would have 
incentive to spend more effort on the relationships with higher marginal utilities.  Equation (2.1) 
indicates that agents spend more resources in asking information from those with more 
information.  Equation (2.2) implies that agents spend more resources in giving information to 
those who have stronger paths back.  In the real world, people usually spend more effort in 
asking for help from those with more information, and spend more effort in offering help to 
those who are more likely to help back.   
        The next proposition describes the efficient networks under the concave specification. 
 
Proposition 2.2  Under the concave specification, the socially efficient network is complete, and 
satisfies the conditions  ∑ = 	 	 	 ∈ , 	 ℎ = ℎ 																								(2.3) 
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ℎ = ℎ 				(2.4) 
Proof.  See Appendix. ∎ 
        The socially efficient network is also complete.  Condition (2.3) is the same as condition 
(2.1).  Equation (2.4) is different from equation (2.2) in the sense that a social planner would 
suggest agents spend to more effort giving information to those who have better relationships 
with others, which results in benefiting the entire society as a whole.  Equation (2.2) and (2.4) 
indicate the possible differences between Nash networks and efficient networks.  
        The first order conditions in Nash networks also shed light on the relationship between 
agents’ asking behavior and giving behavior.  We start with a perfectly symmetric case as shown 
in Example 1. 
Example 2.1  Assume that =  and =  for all ∈ .  If ℎ (⋅) = ℎ (⋅), then a complete 
network with = 	 	 =  for all , , ’ ∈  is a possible Nash network. Moreover, > .   
Proof  See Appendix. ∎ 
        This result is intuitive.  In a perfectly symmetric environment, agents should spend more 
effort in asking information from than giving information to the same person.  Because asking 
results in direct benefits while benefits of giving come from the feedback effect.  During the 
transmission of information, the benefits of giving depreciate more than the benefits of asking.  
Since ℎ (⋅) and 	ℎ (⋅) have the same shape, agents would rather spend more effort in asking 
information.  If asking behavior and giving behavior weigh differently, i.e., ℎ (⋅) >	ℎ (⋅), then 
agents spend even more effort in asking and even less information in giving.  If the reverse is 
true, i.e.,  ℎ (⋅) <	ℎ (⋅), the result can be ambiguous, depending on the relative shape of the 
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ℎ (⋅) and 	ℎ (⋅).  Thus, whether there is a relationship between asking behavior and giving 
behavior is an interesting question which cannot be investigated in separate models of asking and 
giving as in Rogers (2005).  Proposition 2.3 describes the relationship between the agents’ effort 
spent in asking and giving in a general environment. 
Proposition 2.3  Under the concave specification, in any Nash network, if ∗ ∗ < ∗ ∗, then 
agent i’s effort in asking information from agent j is increasing with agent i’s effort in giving 
information to agent j .  
Proof  See Appendix. ∎ 
        The term ∗ ∗ describes 	′s utility of obtaining information from  and ∗ ∗ is to be 
interpreted as 	′s utility of obtaining information from .  Since ∗ ∗ < ∗ ∗, 	′s benefit of 
obtaining information from  is greater than 	′s benefit of obtaining information from .  In this 
case, the proposition implies that agent ’s effort in asking information from agent  is increasing 
with ’ effort spent in giving.  In other words, if agent  decides to spend more resources in 
asking information from , then  would also spend more resources in giving information to .  
Because   benefits more from receiving information than  does.  After  receives those benefits, 
 has more information to return favors back.   
         If ∗ ∗ > ∗ ∗, the relationship between the behavior of asking and giving is uncertain. It 
depends on the difference between the asking component of the relationship quality function, ℎ (⋅)	and the giving component of the relationship quality function,	ℎ (⋅). 
2.3.2   Linear specification 
Under the concave specification, every agent has the incentive to both ask and give.  Because at 
a low level of effort, the marginal return is high.  When the relationship quality is a linear 
function, agents do not necessarily have the incentive to give information to others.  The benefit 
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of giving comes from the feedback effect: if your neighbors’ information increases by receiving 
information from you, you would be better off by being able to receive more information from 
your neighbors.  Under the linear specification, the effort in asking is a perfect substitute for the 
effort in giving.  So agents would rather directly ask for information since the benefit of giving 
depreciates more through paths back to themselves.  The following proposition describes this 
phenomenon. 
Proposition 2.4 Under the linear specification, each agent only spends effort in asking 
information from other agents. In other words, = 0, 	 	 	 	 . 
Proof.  See Appendix. ∎ 
        So under the linear specification, every model of asking and giving is reduced to a model 
of asking.  In Nash networks, nobody wants to spend effort in giving information to others.  The 
benefits of giving information depreciate during the transmission process and asking directly 
reduces depreciation. 
        Under the concave specification, the analysis is easier because of the assumptions lim→ ℎ ( ) = ∞ and lim→ ℎ ( ) = ∞.  The solution of the utility maximization problem is interior.  
This is not guaranteed under the linear specification, however.  The characterization of Nash 
networks is difficult.  To make the model tractable, we consider two types of asymmetries in a 
small universe of agents with = 3, following Brueckner (2006).  In the real world, network 
patterns often exhibit heterogeneity.  Some agents have higher intrinsic values while others may 
have higher budget.  In the first type of asymmetry, one agent is an “endowment-attractive 
agent”, having higher intrinsic value than the other agents, who remain symmetric.  In the second 
type, one individual is a “budget-attractive” agent, with more resources to allocate in asking than 
the other agents, who again remain symmetric.  Formal assumptions are given as follows. 
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Assumption 2.3 (Endowment-Attractive Case) Suppose there are three agents, with agent 1 
being the endowment-attractive agent. The intrinsic value of agent 1 is 	while the resource 
budget is .  > 	0	and 0	 < 		 	 < 	½.  The other two agents, agent 2 and agent 3 are 
identical, with the same intrinsic value  and the same budget . > .  
        Notice the only difference between the endowment-attractive agent and the others is that the 
endowment-attractive agent has higher intrinsic value. 
Assumption 2.4 (Budget-Attractive Case): Suppose there are three agents, with agent 1 being 
the budget-attractive agent. The intrinsic value of agent 1 is 	while resource budget is .  >	0	and 0	 < 		 	< 	½.  The other two agents, agent 2 and agent 3 are identical, with the same 
intrinsic value  and the same budget .  0 < < .  
        The only difference between the budget-attractive agent and the others is that the budget-
attractive agent has more resources to spend.  This discussion proceeds by characterizing Nash 
networks and efficient networks under assumptions 3 and 4. 
Proposition 2.5 In both endowment-attractive and budget-attractive networks under the linear 
specification, (1) the non-attractive agents spend all effort asking information from agent 1; (2) 
Nash networks and efficient networks coincide. 
Proof.  See Appendix. ∎ 
        According to Proposition 2.4, agents under linear specification only spend effort in asking.  
Proposition 2.5 further shows that when asymmetries are introduced, non-attractive agents only 
connect with attractive agent.  To understand this conclusion, consider first the endowment-
attractive case.  Agent 1 has higher intrinsic value, which makes him/her more attractive to the 
other agents.  Other agents are willing to spend all their effort in asking information from agent 1 
so that they can get more information.  In the budget-attractive case, agent 1 is more able to get 
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information from other agents because of the higher budget level, which again makes him/her 
more attractive.  As a result, other agents are willing to spend all their effort in asking 
information from agent 1.  This is consistent with the results from Brueckner (2006): non-
attractive agents spend more effort linking with the attractive agent. 
2.4   Conclusion 
In this paper we study a setting in which agents spend resources in both giving information to 
and asking information from connections to their neighbors.  We generalize the models of link 
formation of Rogers (2005) by combining the model of asking and the model of giving and 
allowing that giving and asking choices can be made separately and simultaneously by each 
agent.  We focus on two specifications: the concave specification and the linear specification.  
Under the concave specification, the results show that people usually spend more effort in asking 
for help from those with more information, and spend more effort in offering help to those from 
whom they can receive more information.  A social planner wants people to spend more effort in 
giving if they have better aggregate relationships with others.  If an agent’s direct neighbor 
benefits more from receiving information, then this agent’s effort in asking information from is 
increasing with the effort in giving information to this neighbor.   
        Next, we turn our attention to the linear case.  In the linear case, we find people only spend 
resources in asking because the behavior of giving suffers more depreciation.  In an effort to 
further study the impact of asymmetries and make the model tractable, we follow Brueckner 
(2006) by considering an endowment-attractive case and a budget-attractive case in a small 
universe of agents with = 3.  In the endowment-attractive case, the attractive agent has higher 
intrinsic value while in the budget-attractive case, the attractive agent has higher budget level.  
In both cases, non-attractive agents spend all their resources connecting with the attractive 
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agents.  This conclusion is consistent with the finding of Breuckner (2006).  Moreover, in both 
cases, efficient networks coincide with Nash networks. 
        This paper analyzes of network formation under heterogeneous environments.  Rogers 
(2005) takes redundancy and feedback effects into account.  The model of asking and giving not 
only benefits from Rogers’ work but also provides an approachable avenue for studying the 
relationship between asking and giving behavior.  This provides many directions for future work.  
First, other specifications of the link quality function may be assumed.  Another extension may 
be making people’s giving behavior interdependent.  For example, if one agent refuses to help 
the other agent, then the other agent’s willingness to offer help will be reduced.  The results in 
the linear case are for a simple network with only three agents.  Thus another future direction can 
be based upon examining whether the results still hold in a larger universe of agents. 
2.5 Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 2.1: The utility maximization problem of i, taking the strategies of others as 
given, is  max, 	 . . ≤ 	 
        The assumption that  lim→ ℎ ( ) = ∞, and lim→ ℎ ( ) = ∞ ensures that the solution for this 
problem is interior.  Then the first order conditions are = , and	 = , for all j, j’ ≠ 
i.  





= (Φ) = ℎ ′( ) ⋮  
        and 
= (Φ) = ℎ ′( ) ⋮  
         The ith components of the derivatives are simply ℎ = ℎ , and	 ℎ = ℎ 			∎ 
Proof of Proposition 2.2: The utility maximization problem is  max, 	 . . ≤ 	 
        An efficient network exists since the choice sets are compact and ∑  is continuous.  The 
assumption that  lim→ ℎ ( ) = ∞, and lim→ ℎ ( ) = ∞ ensures that the solution for this problem is 
interior.  Then the first order conditions are 
∑ = ∑ , and	 ∑ = ∑ , for all j, j’ ≠ i.  
        From the proof of proposition 2.1, we have ℎ = ℎ , ℎ = ℎ .			∎ 
Lemma 1   = ℎ ( ) ;	 = ℎ . 






 Right-multiplying by  and rearranging produces 
= 	 ( ) 	and = 	 ( ) ,		 
since = ( − ( )) . 
        The results are just the scalar forms of the above two equations.			∎ 
Proof of Example 2.1: The first order conditions indicate ℎ = ℎ  
In a perfectly symmetric case, = .  Since > , ℎ < ℎ .  If ℎ (⋅) = ℎ (⋅), > .  Because ℎ (⋅) and ℎ (⋅) are concave. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3: The first order conditions are 
= = = 	, ∀	 , , and	 .	 
         The marginal utilities agents i obtains from each link should be the same.  Otherwise, agent 
i has the incentive to change his/her behavior.  From the proof of Proposition 2.1, ℎ = ℎ = ℎ = ℎ ′( ) . 
          Differentiating ℎ = ℎ  yields 
ℎ + ℎ + ℎ = 
ℎ + ℎ + ℎ . 
          Rearrange the above equation so that we obtain the following expression describing the 
relationship between the effort spent on asking information from another agent and the effort 
spent on giving information to the same person:  
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= ℎ + ℎ + ℎ − ℎ
− ℎ /ℎ . 
        Substituting   = ℎ , = ℎ 	from	the	proof	of	Proposition	2.1 
and		 = ℎ , = ℎ 	from	Lemma	1, 
									 == ℎ + ℎ ℎ + ℎ ℎ
− ℎ ℎ − ℎ ℎ /ℎ . 
         Simplifying the above equation with ℎ = ℎ  produces 
									 = ℎ + ℎ ℎ + ℎ ℎ
− ℎ ℎ − ℎ ℎ /ℎ  																	= ℎ + ℎ ℎ − ℎ ℎ  /ℎ  																= ℎ + ℎ ℎ ( − ) /ℎ  
        Note that ℎ < 0, ℎ < 0, ℎ > 0, ℎ > 0, > 0	and	 > 0 
        If < , this indicates > 0. 
        Therefore, then agent i’s effort in asking information from agent j is increasing with agent 




Proof of Proposition 4: Under linear specification, , = + .  This implies, 
( ) = 0 ++ 0 ⋯ +⋯ +⋮ ⋮+ + ⋱ ⋮⋯ 0 . 
  
        Since = (1 − ( )) , we first construct 1 − ( ), 
= − ( ) = 1 −( + )−( + ) 1 ⋯ −( + )⋯ −( + )⋮ ⋮−( + ) −( + ) ⋱ ⋮⋯ 1 . 
         Recall = 	 .  To get each agent’s utility , first we need to know the matrix : 
= ( − ( ))| − ( )| . 
        Then = [ ] 	 ∙ 	 = [ ( ( ))] 	| ( )| ∙ 	 .  Notice  does not show up in [ ( − ( ))] 	  but show up in | − ( )| as negative elements. This indicates less  
results in a higher utility.  If each agent aims at maximizing his/her own benefits, he/she will not 
spend effort in giving, i.e., = 0.			∎ 
Proof of Proposition 5: First, look at the endowment-attractive case.  There is no interior 
solution for Nash equilibrium. To prove this, suppose the contrary is true: there is an interior 
solution.  The three agents’ utility should satisfy the following two relations: = +  = + + ( − )  
        Solving for 	yields  =  . 
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        Taking derivative with respect to  produces 
= (1 − )( − )(1 − + − ) > 0 
        So agent 2 or 3 can get more benefit as they spend more effort in asking information from 
the endowment-attractive agent.  A contradiction arises, ruling out the initial assumption.  In a 
Nash network, both agent 2 and agent 3 spend all their effort asking information from agent 1. 
        In an efficient network, the total utility of all the three agents is maximized.  That is, max	 +2 . 
        Taking derivative of the total utility with respect to  produces ( +2 ) = (1 − )( − ) + 2(1 − )( − )(1 − + − ) > 0 
        So total utility increases as agent 2 and agent 3 spend more effort in asking information 
from the endowment-attractive agent.  Hence, in an efficient network, both agent 2 and agent 3 
spend all their effort asking information from agent 1.  Efficient networks coincide with Nash 
networks.  
        Now, we look at the budget-attractive case.  Likewise, there is no interior solution for Nash 
equilibrium.  To prove this, suppose the contrary is true: there is an interior solution.  The three 
agents’ utility should satisfy the following two relations: = +  = + + ( − )  
        Solving for 	yields  =  . 




        Taking derivative with respect to  produces 
= ( − )(1 − + − ) > 0 
        So agent 2 or 3 can get more benefit as they spend more effort in asking information from 
the budget-attractive agent.  A contradiction arises, ruling out the initial assumption.  In a Nash 
network, both agent 2 and agent 3 spend all their effort asking information from agent 1. 
        In an efficient network, the total utility of all the three agents is maximized.  That is, max	 +2 . 
        Taking derivative of the total utility with respect to  produces ( +2 ) = ( − ) + 2( − )(1 − + − ) > 0 
         So the total utility increases as agent 2 and agent 3 spend more effort in asking information 
from the budget-attractive agent.  Hence, in an efficient network, both agent 2 and agent 3 spend 






CHAPTER 3: LINEAGE-BASED FRAGMENTATION AND 
COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN RURAL CHINA1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Developing countries, including China, make tremendous efforts to promote rural development 
and reduce poverty.  Since the success of many economic endeavors, such as exchanges of goods 
and services and public-good provision, depends on cooperation, the study of cooperative 
behavior in rural areas is of great importance.  In the presence of imperfect contract enforcement, 
informal institutions then play an important role in rural development.  Existing studies have 
associated fractionalization, measured by ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity, with 
trust, economic growth and the quality of governance (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 
1999, 2002).  In rural China, though the economy has made great strides towards modernization, 
many villages are still structured by a number of traditional lineage organizations, which results 
in lineage-based fragmentation.  The goal of this paper is to examine how lineage-based 
fragmentation affects cooperative behavior in rural China. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents a full picture of cooperative 
behavior by examining both intra-group and inter-group cooperation.  Bowles and Gintis (2008) 
argue that cooperation can take the form of mutually beneficial transactions that may fail to 
materialize without trust and reciprocity (intra-group); it can also take the form of public-good 
provision that requires agreement and collective action (inter-group).  In this paper, we measure 
intra-group cooperation by the frequency of mutual help that occurs between lineage members, 
and inter-group cooperation by individuals’ contribution to build village infrastructures and the 
share of village budget that is spent on village public goods.   
                                                            
1 We are grateful to Sudipta Sarangi and R. Carter Hill for suggestions. We also thank Matthew Jackson and Francis 
Bloch for valuable comments at the Networks and Development Conference 2012.  
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There is a growing body of literature studying the impact of heterogeneity on provision of 
public goods.  The findings generally indicate that heterogeneity in ethnicity, religion and social 
class undermines inter-group cooperation and public-good provision (Alesina et al., 1999; 
Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005; Bandiera et al., 2005).  Our findings are consistent with 
the literature in this perspective.  We find that villages that are more diversified in terms of 
lineage composition spend a lower share of the village budget on village public goods and people 
in more diversified villages contribute less labor to build village infrastructures.  Since both the 
provision of public goods in rural China and fragmentation are measured at the village level, our 
study presents a more convincing relationship between the two variables than some existing 
literature does.  For example, Alesina (1999) studies the relationship between ethnic composition 
in U.S. metropolitan areas and the share of metropolitan government expenditure on public 
goods such as education.  However, spending on education is mostly determined at a much more 
local level, school-districts.  Under the mismatching scenario, it would be difficult to determine 
the causal relationship between fragmentation and provision of public goods.     
The empirical studies on intra-group cooperation are rare.  Conflict theory in sociology 
suggests that diversity fosters in-group solidarity as well as out-group distrust (Blalock, 1967).  
In other words, with growing diversity of the population, people stick to their own group more 
and trust others less.  According to this theory, one would expect that the people who live in 
more diversified villages, in terms of lineage compositions, should be more willing to cooperate 
with the same lineage members than those who live in homogenous villages.  However, our 
findings imply the opposite case.  Putnam (2007) claims that the fundamental assumption behind 
conflict theory – in-group trust and out-group trust are negatively correlated – is unwarranted.  In 
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other words, bonding with own-group members is not necessarily at the cost of bridging with 
other groups.  Our paper provides important empirical evidence for Putnam’s arguments.   
China serves as an excellent case for studying fractionalization because the lineage 
composition within a village is exogenously determined.  The lineage culture in rural China can 
be dated back to hundreds of years ago.  Extended families related in men’s line live in one 
settlement and form a lineage.  The size of a lineage ranges from a few to a few hundred 
households.  All men in one lineage are descendants of a common ancestor, and, consequently 
bear the same surname.  Over generations, the common surname becomes the lineage identity 
and promotes solidarity among lineage members (Peng, 2004).  Shortly after communist China 
was founded in 1949, the central government set up administrative villages in order to strengthen 
the Party’s rule and to build up the Commune system.  The administrative villages, the lowest 
level of administrative agency in China, also serve as the lowest level of collective farming unit 
in the Commune system.  To meet the needs of collective farming, administrative villages 
arbitrarily included one or more adjacent lineages (Wang, 2006).2  Therefore, the lineage 
composition within a village is exogenously determined by the shock of China’s administrative 
re-organization.  In addition, in 1958, China enacted the household registration system, which 
inhibits free migrations and essentially ties rural people to the land where they were born.  Thus, 
the lineage composition in rural villages has remained static since 1958.3  The identification in 
this paper arises from the exogenous and predetermined fragmentation.  By contrast, the 
measurements of fragmentation in the existing literature are usually endogenous.  For instance, 
                                                            
2 A very large lineage can be broken into several single-lineage villages.     
3 The household registration system has been partially relaxed since the 1980s.  The surplus rural laborers pour to 
cities seeking non-agricultural jobs.  However, rural workers do not have the same access as urban citizens to 
medication, pension, housing and children’s schooling in cities, which makes permanent rural-to-urban migrations 
still extremely difficult.  Most rural workers have to commute between cities and their original villages several times 




Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2002) use ethnic divisions within a county; 
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) use ethno-linguistic diversity within a district in Kenya; Egel (201l) 
uses the number of tribes within a subdistrict in Yemen.  The fragmentation within a country or a 
region is probably associated with other characteristics of the country or region that can directly 
affect the outcomes. 
In addition, lineage-specific culture traditionally is more predominant in the South than in the 
North of China (Freedman, 1965).4  The South-North divide enables us to apply the Difference-
in-Difference (D-in-D) method to further refine the identification.  First, we examine the 
difference in cooperative behavior between the people from lineage-heterogeneous villages and 
those from lineage-homogenous villages.  Then we further investigate whether the difference is 
stronger in the South than in the North.  If the answer is affirmative, this indicates that the 
lineage-based heterogeneity affects people’s cooperative behavior.  We also apply the D-in-D 
models to exclude the possibility that there may be other unobserved differences between 
homogeneous villages and heterogeneous villages that have impacts on people’s cooperative 
behavior.  Notice the D-in-D method does not assume that the lineage-heterogeneous villages 
and the lineage-homogenous villages are the same in all other aspects.  Instead, the identification 
assumption is that the two kinds of villages can be different in other aspects but those 
differences, if there are any, do not vary from the South to the North.  In the paper, we present 
evidence that the assumption holds.         
                                                            
4 Freedman (1965) proposes three reasons to explain the South-North difference.  First, the political center of China 
is usually established in the North.  Hence, the South is far from formal government control.  Second, rice-
cultivation in the South demands extensive irrigation.  Inter-household cooperation in irrigation could be the base 
from which the lineage organizations emerged.  Third, the population in the South has many immigrants from the 
North.  The exigency of frontier life could stimulate the development of lineages.      
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Using data from the Chinese Household Income Project Survey (CHIPS) 2002, we measure 
intra-lineage cooperation by the frequency of mutual help within a lineage.  Two kinds of mutual 
help are considered: monetary help and non-monetary help that is time-consuming.  We find that 
lineage-based fragmentation has a negative effect on the frequency of both monetary and non-
monetary mutual help.  It turns out villagers do not treat them differently when it comes to 
lineage obligations and enforcement.  Inter-lineage cooperation is measured by villagers’ 
physical contribution to public goods and the share of village budget spent on public goods.  Our 
results show that lineage-based fragmentation has a negative effect on inter-lineage cooperative 
behavior as well.  In other words, people in lineage-homogenous villages are more likely to 
engage in reciprocal behavior with their lineage members, as well as contribute to the provision 
of public goods that are jointly shared across lineages.  We also find that the association between 
the lineage-based homogeneity and the cooperative behavior is stronger in the South. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data.  We provide some 
background information about lineages and public-good provision in rural China.  Section 3 
presents the empirical models.  Section 4 discusses the results.  The last section concludes.  
3.2  Background and data 
We use data from the rural section of the CHIPS 2002 survey.  In this portion of the survey, 
9200randomly-selected households were interviewed from 961 villages in 22 provinces.5  Figure 
3.1 presents a map of the provinces in China and the surveyed provinces have been shaded.  To 
measure the cultural differences between the South and the North, we separate 22 provinces into  
                                                            
5 Although there are in total 34 province-level administrative units in China, the 22 provinces in CHIPS 2002 
provide a nationally representative sample. The 22 provinces were selected from four distinct regions in China--- 
metropolitan region, eastern region, central region, and western region --- to reflect variations in economic 




Figure 3.1: The surveyed provinces in China 
two groups: Southern provinces and Northern provinces.  As shown in Figure 3.1, darker shade 
denotes Southern provinces.  The geographic border between Northern and Southern China is 
defined by the line of Huaihe River and Qinling mountains.6  The South/North of China in this 
analysis includes the provinces located in the South/North of the line.  There are four exceptions: 
Shandong, Chongqing, Yunnan and Guizhou provinces.  We group Shandong province into the 
South, though it locates in the North of the line, because lineage culture in Shandong province 
traditionally is strong (Wang, 2007).  Likewise, Chongqing, Yunnan and Guizhou are grouped as 
the north, despite that their geographic locations are in the South.  This is because these 
provinces have large minority populations.  Unlike Han ethnicity, minorities usually do not have 
                                                            
6 The Qinling-Huaihe line is an important agro-climatic demarcation line in China.  On the two sides of this line, the 
climate, flora and fauna, and agricultural products are very different.    
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the lineage culture.  In total, ten provinces are defined as in the South and twelve provinces are 
defined as in the North.7 
In our sample, individual-level questions were answered by heads of households.  For each 
village, the village-level questions were answered by a village representative who was familiar 
with geographic, demographic and economic characteristics of the village.  A village 
representative could be the party branch secretary, the head of village committee, or the village 
accountant, whoever was available during the survey.  Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for 
all the variables that are at the core of this analysis.  In the following subsection, we describe our 
variables of interest.  
3.2.1 Three types of villages 
Two village-level questions in the survey enable us to categorize the 961 villages into three types 
in terms of fragmentation.  The two questions are as follows： 
• Q1. “Is the percentage of households belonging to the largest lineage more than 
50%?”   
• Q2. “Is the percentage of households belonging to the top five largest lineages more 
than 50%?”   
In the sample, villages that answered “yes” to Q1 are defined as type 1 villages.  Villages that 
answered “no” to Q1 and “yes” to Q2 are type 2 villages.  Villages who answered “no” to both 
Q1 and Q2 are type 3 villages.  Thus type 1 villages are the most homogenous villages as the 
majority of households in a type 1 village are from the largest lineage.  Type 3 villages are the  
  
                                                            
7 The provinces in “the South” include Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, and Sichuan.  The provinces in “the North” include Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Henan, 











All South North 






Help =0, 1, 2, or 3.  The smallest value of help is 0 which means the respondent 
 answers “non/few” or “sometimes” to all the three categories (help  
farming, help house building and help taking care of others); the largest  
value of help is 3 which means the respondent answers “often” or “very  







Fulfill =1 if the respondent physically fulfills the assigned collective working  
requirement without paying any penalty;  





























Definition All South North 
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        Poverty =1 if the village is in a county designated as province or national level 
poverty county or in a town designated as the province level poverty 
town; 




































(Table 3.1 continued) 
 
Village Characteristics Definition All South North 
    
Village head 
 
    






Age =1 if the age of the village head is 29 or below;  
=2 if between30-34; =3 if between 35-39;  
=4 if between 40-44; =5 if between 45-49; =6 if between 50-54;  







Education =1 if the educational level of the village head is primary school or less;  
=2 if junior middle school; =3 if senior middle school;  









=1 if the village head has the experience of  









=1 if the village head has the experience of operating 















Definition All South North 
   
The Party Secretary 
 
    






Age =1 if the age of the party secretary is 29 or below;  
=2 if between30-34; =3 if between 35-39;  
=4 if between 40-44; =5 if between 45-49; =6 if between 50-54; 







Education =1 if the educational level of the party secretary is primary school or 
less;  
=2 if junior middle school; =3 if senior middle school;  









=1 if the party secretary has the experience of  









=1 if the party secretary has the experience of operating 














Definition All South North 
















































        Past disaster Number of natural disasters suffered in the past five years (1998-








a. In 2002, 1 USD= 8.2770 Yuan , according to China Statistical Yearbook 2011 
b. Cadre means administrators in China.  In both Russia’s and China’s revolutionary eras, the word refers to a group of leaders active in promoting the revolution 
of the communist party.  It no longer has any revolutionary implications in today’s China. 
c. If there is a missing value, replace it with a value estimated from education level. For example, if the education level is college or above, I use 17 years of 
education; if professional school, I use 14 years of education; if middle level professional, technical or vocational school, I use 12 years; if senior middle school, 
use 12; if junior middle school, use 9; if 4 or more years of elementary school, use 5; if 1-3 years of elementary school, use 2; if illiterate or semi-illiterate, use 0 
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most heterogeneous villages as each village consists of a number of small lineages.  Type 2 is a 
medium type.  Figure 3.2 provides a visual comparison of lineage composition in the three types 
of villages.  In our sample, 30 percent of the villages are type 1 and 37 percent are type 2. 
There is another household-level question that also provides lineage information:  
• “Does your family belong to the largest lineage in the village?”   
We use the surveyed households to calculate the percentage of the largest-lineage households 
in each village.  Our calculations show that, on average, type 1 villages have 71%, type 2 
villages have 37% and type 3 villages have 15% respectively of households belonging to the 
largest local lineage.  Thus type 3 villages are the most heterogeneous villages while type 1 
villages are almost twice as homogenous as type 2 villages.  
We use type 3 villages as the reference group and examine whether people in type 1 and 2 
villages are more cooperative.  Therefore, we define two binary variables: TYPE1 and TYPE2.  
TYPE1 is 1 if the respondent belongs to a type 1 village and 0 otherwise.  Similarly TYPE2 is 1 if 
the respondent belongs to a type 2 village and 0 otherwise.   
3.2.2 Intra-lineage reciprocity variables 
Next we describe the construction of the variables capturing intra-lineage interaction.  We use 
the following question from CHIPS 2002:  
• “How often do you offer the following types of mutual help to your relatives and 
neighbors?”   
The types of mutual help include: (i) borrowing and lending money; (ii) helping in farming 
during the busy season; (iii) helping in house building; and (iv) taking care of the elderly, the 













































    Figure 3.2: Three types of villages by lineage compositions 
  







village, we assume that the respondent’s relatives and neighbors are mostly from his/her own 
lineage.  Therefore, we use the answers to this question to proximate intra-lineage reciprocity.  
Among the four types of help listed above, the first one reflects monetary reciprocity while the 
other three capture the non-pecuniary favors, especially those favors that require an investment 
of time.  Therefore, we define two dependent variables: borrow and help to separate monetary 
from non-monetary reciprocities.  The binary variable borrow takes the value 1 if the respondent 
answered that borrowing or lending money happened often or very frequently, and zero if the 
respondent answered that this mutual help happened rarely or never.  With regard to the other 
three types of mutual help, (ii), (iii) and (iv), we first construct a binary variable for each type in 
the same way as we construct borrow.  Then we define help by adding up the three indicators.  
Hence, help takes values 0, 1, 2 or 3 where a larger number implies more mutual help regardless 
of the type of non-monetary help.  For example, 0 means that all the three binary help variables 
are 0s: the respondent answered mutual help in all the three types (ii), (iii) and (iv) happened 
rarely or never; 3, the greatest possible number of help, indicates all the three binary variables 
take the value of 1: the respondent answered mutual help in type (ii), (iii) and (iv) happened often 
or very frequently. 
3.2.3 Inter-lineage cooperation variables 
A commonly used measurement of inter-group cooperation in literature is the provision of public 
goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Banerjee et al., 2005).  Following the literature, we examine 
villagers’ physical contribution to villages’ public goods and the share of villages’ budgets spent 
on public goods.  Village public goods, such as irrigation facilities, roads, and schools, are jointly 
consumed by all villagers, regardless of their lineage membership.  Therefore, people’s 
willingness to invest in public goods reflects the inter-lineage reciprocities in any given village.   
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Before 2002, all villagers (between the ages of 18 and 65) in China were required by law to 
provide unpaid labor to build local public goods, such as irrigation systems, dams, roads, school 
buildings. 8  The number of regulated days of unpaid work varied from place to place, but was 
usually around 7-21 days per year.  If villagers could not physically participate in the unpaid 
work, they were charged fines for each day they missed.  The villages could use the collected 
fines to hire other people to replace the missing laborers.  Since 2002, China has gradually 
reduced and eventually waived this unpaid-labor duty.  However, this reform did not take effect 
at the same pace across the nation.  When CHIPS 2002 was conducted, this reform had still not 
been implemented in 140 out of the 961 surveyed villages which provide us with data on the 
fulfillment of the unpaid-labor requirement.  In these 140 villages, each surveyed household 
reported the number of days that they were required to work for free and the number of days they 
actually completed in 2002.  Based on this  information, we construct the variable fulfill, which 
is the ratio of the number of completed days to the number of required days, to measure the 
households’ physical contribution to village public goods.  
        To further investigate monetary contribution to public goods, we construct another two 
village level variables for this: (i) share, which measures the share of village budget spent on 
education, the medical system, and other commonweal expenditure (i.e., expenditure on 
environment protection and public safety); (ii) sgrowth, which measures the change of share 
from 1998 to 2002.  
                                                            
8 According to the Regulations on Peasants’ Fees and Services (1992) announced by the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China.  Before the tax-for-fee reform around 2002, households were required to supply labor for free to 
local authorities mostly for the construction of local infrastructure.  The number of regulated days varied with local 
needs.  Local authorities were responsible for enforcing this regulation.  The unpaid labor requirement should take 
place during off-season in farming. 
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        Alesina et al. (1999) find a negative relationship between public good provision in U.S. 
cities and ethnic diversity from the median voter theorem.  However, given the nature of political 
institutions in China, it is not entirely clear how the provision of public goods was determined in 
rural villages.  In fact, due to a series of political and financial reforms in rural China around 
1990s, villagers had been granted increasing power to determine who the village leaders were, 
and how to spend the village budget (Zhang et al., 2004).  Before 1988, villages were governed 
by village Party branches, whose members were appointed by county-level Party committee.  In 
1988, the Organic Law of Village Committees was implemented.  This law let villagers elect 
village councils, who share the administrative power with the Party branches.  The village 
council members are chosen from villagers.  Though the specific way of sharing the power 
between village councils and the Party branches varies from village to village, the right to vote 
for their own leaders increases villagers’ awareness of participating in public affairs and their 
desire to communicate their demands (Coniff, 2004).  In 1998, a revised version of the Organic 
Law of Village Committees was passed, aiming at further improving the democracy of rural 
governance.  The new law clarifies the regulations on how the elections should be held (for 
example, open primaries should be hold to nominate the candidates).  In her testimony to the 
U.S. congress, in 2002, Anne Thurston stated that “there is some evidence, though we certainly 
need more research, that governance in such villages has improved, finances have become more 
transparent, and corruption has declined.”  Despite the fact that rural China is far from being 
fully democratic, there are still some channels though which villagers can participate in public 
affairs.  This is all we need for our analysis.  In addition, as rural China is making progress in 
switching to democratic electoral process, one would expect that the provision of public good 
should become increasingly aligned with the median voter’s opinion.  If the median voters in 
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homogenous and heterogeneous villages have different opinions in the supply of public good, 
one should observe that the provision of public goods would have distinctive paths of growth 
over time across different types of villages.  Therefore, we investigate sgrowth, the change in the 
share of public goods in village budget from 1998 to 2000. 
3.2.4 Other control variables 
The survey process collected detailed data about individual and household information as 
reported in the last panel of Table 3.1.  We now discuss some of these variables which are 
specific to our data set.  CADRE is a binary variable indicating whether or not the respondent is a 
village cadre and 15.8 percent of respondents were village cadres. 9  EDUCATION measures the 
respondent’s years of schooling.  SURNAME is a binary variable which takes value 1 if the 
respondent belongs to the largest lineage in the village.  Following the study by Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2002), we construct a PAST DISASTER variable which takes value of 1, 2, 3 or 4.  A 
larger number indicates that the respondent suffered more natural disasters in the last five years 
(1998 – 2002).  Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) includes a similar indicator, “recent traumas” in 
their model, which is equal to 1 if the respondent suffered a negative experience in the past year 
such as divorce, diseases, accidents, financial misfortune.  Their study shows “recent traumas” 
has a negative impact on trust.  Due to data limitations, we do not have all the details on 
villagers’ past experiences.  Our analysis uses PAST DISASTER instead to check if the number of 
disasters suffered by the respondent affects his/her cooperative behavior.   
Village characteristics are reported in the second panel of Table 3.1.  The mean of 
MOUNTAIN is 0.505, implying that approximately half of the villages are located in the 
                                                            
9 Cadre means administrators in China.  In both Russia’s and China’s revolutionary eras, the word refers to a group of 
leaders active in promoting the revolution of the communist party.  It no longer has any revolutionary implications in 
today’s China (Pan, 2012). 
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mountainous area.  Since the village location plays an important role in the prevalence of lineage 
culture (Freedman, 1965), we also include other geographic controls, such as whether the village 
is the suburb of a city, the distance to the nearest transportation terminals and the distance to the 
nearest county.  Irrigation is the most important form of long-term inter-lineage cooperation in 
rural China (Freedman, 1965).  Therefore we control for the variable, denoted as CANAL98, 
which measures whether the village used the canal as the major irrigating method in 1998.  In 
rural China, the village is led by a village head (the chairman of the village committee) and a 
party secretary.  The village economy depends heavily on village leadership (Oi, 1999).  Thus, 
the characteristics of village leaders are controlled for our analysis.  A total of five measures are 
used:  the number of years the village leader have been in office, age of the village leader, 
education level of the village leader, enterprise management experience and the experience of 
operating non-agriculture business family business.  
        The outcome variables are listed in the first panel of Table 3.1, followed by village 
characteristics in the second panel and individual characteristics in the last panel. 
3.3 The models 
In this section we focus on describing the models used in the analysis.  We use individual level 
models to examine intra-lineage cooperative behavior and villagers’ physical contribution to 
public goods.  These models are presented in subsection 3.1.  When we study the impact of 
lineage-based fragmentation on the share of village budget spent on public goods, we use village 
level models demonstrated in subsection 3.2. 
3.3.1 Intra-lineage  
Our basic model for intra-lineage relationships is  = 1 + 2 + + + + 					(3.1) 
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where the subscripts indicate individual i in village j of province p. The outcome variable is help 
or borrow.  TYPE1 and TYPE2 are the village-type indicators.   is a vector of other village 
characteristics.  It includes net income per capita, and its squared form so that we are able to test 
whether the effect of income per capita on cooperative behavior is stronger or weaker as villages 
get wealthier.    also includes an indicator for mountainous area, a suburb indicator, distance 
to the closest transportation station, distance to the closest transportation terminals, poverty 
indicator, total population, total planting area, characteristics of village leaders and a binary 
variable indicating whether the village uses a canal as the major irrigating method in 1998.   
is a vector of individual characteristics.  It includes age and a quadratic form of age, so that we 
can examine whether the effect of age on cooperative behavior is stronger or weaker as people 
get older.  It also includes a sex indicator, years of schooling, marital status, a cadre indicator, an 
indicator of marital status, household income, family size, a binary variable indicating whether 
the individual belongs to the largest lineage in the village and the number of natural disasters 
he/she suffered in the past five years (1998-2002).    is a vector of province fixed effects, 
ruling out systematic differences between provinces.   
        Since borrow is a binary variable, we use a probit model to estimate regression coefficients.  
Help is a discrete ordinal variable.  More specifically, we classify the frequency of non-monetary 
help into 4 categories, with 3 thresholds.  Therefore we use an ordered probit model when help is 
the outcome variable.  
        We expect intra-lineage cooperation is more frequent in homogenous villages than in 
heterogeneous villages.  The identification strategy in this paper arises from the exogenous and 
predetermined fragmentation.  We use model (3.1) to examine whether intra-lineage cooperation 
is more frequent in homogenous villages than in heterogeneous villages.  Since the lineage 
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culture traditionally is more predominant in the South than in the North of China, to further 
refine the identification, we separate the entire sample into two subsamples – Southern provinces 
and Northern provinces.  We apply model (3.1) to each subsample and investigate whether the 
difference is stronger in the South than in the North.   If the answer is affirmative, this indicates 
that the lineage-based heterogeneity affects people’s cooperative behavior.  However, to achieve 
the necessary identification, the model needs an assumption, i.e., the villages of the three types 
are not different in unobserved aspects that can directly affect people’s cooperative behavior.  
Otherwise, our estimates may be biased.  Hence, we use the following D-in-D model to identify 
the impact of fragmentation under a relaxed assumption that unobserved differences between 
types are allowed:    = 1 + 2 + 1 ∗ 	 + 2 ∗  + + + + 				(3.2) 
where SOUTH is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the respondent is from the South of 
China.   and  measure the impact of lineage composition in the North.  +  and + 	measure the impact of lineage composition in the South.   and  reflect whether the 
impact of lineage composition are different between the South and the North.  The lineage 
culture is more prevalent in Southern China than in Northern China.  If homogeneity promotes 
intra-lineage cooperation, the impact should be stronger in the South.  Then  and  will be 
positive.  The assumption of the model is that the differences in other characteristics across of 
the three-type villages, apart from lineage culture, do not change from the South to the North.  





3.3.2 Inter-lineage  
The measurements of inter-lineage cooperation include fulfill, which is an individual-level 
outcome, and share and sgrowth, which are two village-level outcomes.  The models for the 
fulfill variable are the same as in the models (3.1) and (3.2) except that the fine charged for each 
missed day of unpaid work is also included in , besides all other village characteristics.  The 
models for the share variable are as follows:  = 1 + 2 + + + 						(3.3)  = 1 + 2 + 1 ∗ 	+ 2 ∗ + + + .					(3.4) 
The literature (Alesina et al., 1999; Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005; Bandiera et al., 
2005 and Vigdor, 2004) finds that ethnic diversity discourages people from contributing to 
public goods.  Thus, we hypothesize that , , 	 	 > 0.  
Note that when sgrowth is the outcome variable, we aim at examining whether the 
cooperation gap between a homogeneous village and a heterogeneous village is larger in 2002 
because of the political reform implemented since 1998.  So the general model is: ℎ = 1 + 2 + + 1 ∗ + 2 ∗ + + 						(3.5) 
where  is an year indicator. = 1 if the year is 2002; = 0 if the year is 1998. 
In 1998, the model can be rewritten as: ℎ , 	 = 1 + 2 + , + , .						(3.6) 
In 2002, rewrite (3.5) as ℎ , = 1 + 2 + + 1 + 2 + , + , .						(3.7) 
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Thus, we can obtain the following model for the variable sgrowth from (3.7) minus (3.6): ℎ = + 1 + 2 + ∆ + ∆ .						(3.8) 
where ∆  indicates the change of village characteristics from 1998 to 2002. 
Similarly, we derive the following D-in-D model for sgrowth:  ℎ = + 1 + 2 + 1 ∗ 	+ 2 ∗ + ∆ + ∆ .						(3.9) 
Since in a more democratic environment, people have more capacity to participate in 
collective decisions.  Then we can expect public-good provision should increase more in a more 
homogenous village because people’s decision of cooperation could be better realized in 2002.  
In other words, , , 	 	 > 0. 
3.4  Results 
This section discusses results.  We first present evidence that our assumption of D-in-D models 
is justified.  Then we explore how lineage-based fragmentation affects intra-lineage cooperation 
and inter-lineage cooperation respectively.  The regressions control for a large set of individual 
characteristics and village characteristics as presented in Table 3.1.  When borrow is the outcome 
variable, we use a probit model; when help is the outcome variable we use an ordered probit 
model; when the outcome variable is fulfill, share or sgrowth, the results are based on OLS 
estimates.   In addition, we cluster the standard errors by county. 
3.4.1 The D-in-D model 
As discussed in previous section, we apply the D-in-D model to investigate whether our results 
are robust under a relaxed assumption – we allow for unobserved differences across the three 
types of villages that can directly affect people’s cooperative behavior.  However, we also 
assume that the differences across the three types of villages, other than lineage culture, do not 
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change from the South to the North.  Now we examine the validity of this assumption for the D-
in-D model.  We use the individual and village characteristics as the left-hand side variables and 
TYPE1, TYPE2, and the interaction terms 1 ∗  and 2 ∗  as the right-
hand side variables.  We test whether those characteristics are different across the three village 
types (evaluated by the coefficients of TYPE1 and TYPE2), and more importantly, whether those 
differences, if there are any, change from the South to the North (evaluated by the coefficients of 1 ∗  and 2 ∗ ).   
Table 3.2 presents the results.  Notice that the coefficients of TYPE1, TYPE2, 1 ∗
 and 2 ∗  for the dependent variable “SURNAME” are all significantly 
positive.  “SURNAME” is a dummy variable which is 1 if the individual is from the largest 
lineage in the village and zero otherwise.  The four positive coefficients indicate that people in 
type 1 and type 2 villages are more likely than type 3 villages to be from the largest local lineage, 
and this situation is more likely to be the case in the South.  This illustrates that type 1 and type 2 
villages are more homogenous than type 3 villages and the difference in lineage-based 
fragmentation across types of villages is greater in the South than in the North.  However, we do 
not see other variables having the same pattern as “Surname”.  For the other variables, though 
the coefficients of TYPE1 and TYPE2 can be statistically different from zero, the coefficients of 1 ∗  and 2 ∗  are not.  For example, 1 ∗  ( 2 ∗
) does not have a significant impact on the respondent’s education level, implying that 
there is no evidence that the differences in education level between people in type 1 (type 2) 
villages and type3 villages vary from the South to the North.  Thus, the results in Table 3.2 
indicate that while the three types of villages can be different in aspects other than the lineage-
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based fragmentation, there is no evidence that these other differences change from the South to 
the North.     
3.4.2 Intra-lineage relationship 
Using models (3.1) and (3.2), we examine the impact of lineage-based fragmentation on intra-
lineage relationships. Our goal is to investigate whether borrow and help are more likely to 
happen in type 1 and type 2 villages than in type 3 villages.  Regression results are reported in 
Table 3.3 (borrow) and Table 3.4 (help).  Table 3.3 presents marginal probit coefficients 
calculated at the means while Table 3.4 presents ordered probit coefficients.   
In Table 3.3, column 1 demonstrates that frequent monetary help among lineage members is 
more likely to happen in types 1 and 2 villages than in type 3 villages by 6.4 and 5.1 percentage 
points respectively.  The estimated marginal coefficient of TYPE1 is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level of significance while the estimated marginal coefficient of TYPE2 is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  Then we split the entire sample into two 
subsamples: the South and the North.  In the South of China, as presented in column 2, the 
possibility of frequent borrowing and lending within a lineage is 11.6 percentage points higher in 
type 1 villages and 9.3 percentage points higher in type 2 villages than in type 3 villages.  The 
point estimates of TYPE1 and TYPE2 in the South sample are both statistically significant and 
greater in magnitude than those in the entire sample.   By contrast, there is no evidence that 
lineage-based fragmentation has an impact on borrow in the North (column 3).  To further test 
whether the impact of TYPE1 and TYPE2 are different between the south and the North, we use 
the D-in-D model, whose results demonstrate that both the coefficients of TYPE1 and TYPE2 in 
the South is significantly different from that in the North at 10 percent level of significance.  This 




Table 3.2: Examining the assumption of the D-in-D model 
Dependent variables: individual characteristics and village characteristics 
 
 Independent Variables 






1.681** [0.714] 1.131* [0.623] 0.027 [1.001] -0.514 [0.869] 6,840 
Marriage  
 
-0.001 [0.011] -0.015 [0.011] -0.008 [0.016] -0.004 [0.016] 6,840 
Cadre  
 
0.016 [0.029] 0.009 [0.023] 0.014 [0.037] 0.012 [0.033] 6,816 
Education  
 
0.172 [0.189] -0.148 [0.177] -0.077 [0.241] 0.064 [0.219] 6,840 
Hhincome  
 
0.04 [0.050] -0.027 [0.058] -0.074 [0.083] 0.001 [0.076] 6,836 
Hhsize  
 
0.13 [0.099] -0.003 [0.087] -0.045 [0.136] 0.017 [0.114] 6,840 
Surname  
 
0.406*** [0.049] 0.079* [0.044] 0.145** [0.060] 0.139*** [0.052] 6,839 
Past disaster -0.026 [0.156] 0.099 [0.129] 0.126 [0.190] 0.086 [0.165] 6,774 
Note: 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals 






(Table 3.2 continued) 
 
 Independent variables 






-0.034 [0.026] -0.019 [0.027] -0.013 [0.047] -0.008 [0.040] 733 
Mountain  
 
-0.056 [0.076] 0.039 [0.067] -0.041 [0.106] 0.005 [0.086] 733 
Distance to 
Transportation 
-0.188 [1.480] 2.551* [1.535] -0.216 [1.642] -2.559 [1.698] 718 
Distance to 
County  
-4.075 [4.404] -1.821 [3.748] 6.217 [5.328] 2.138 [4.974] 729 
Poverty  
 
-0.036 [0.088] 0.064 [0.074] 0.174 [0.123] 0.054 [0.104] 733 
Poptotal  
 
-0.121 [0.122] -0.1 [0.089] -0.07 [0.162] 0.098 [0.115] 733 
Vincome  
 
-0.067 [0.068] -0.132** [0.066] -0.016 [0.103] 0.116 [0.090] 727 
Plantarea  
 
-0.188 [0.151] 0.053 [0.105] 0.14 [0.223] 0.048 [0.176] 729 
Canal98  
 
-0.09 [0.058] -0.067 [0.069] 0.014 [0.080] 0.086 [0.076] 694 
Penalty  3.484 [2.766] 1.795 [2.368] -4.276 [3.030] -0.524 [2.713] 153 
Note: 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals 





(Table 3.2 continued) 
 
 Independent Variables 




      Village leaders (the party secretary) 
Years in office 0.921 [1.030] -0.806 [0.806] -2.204 [1.376] 1.406 [1.247] 733 
age 0.115 [0.223] 0.001 [0.219] -0.187 [0.306] 0.231 [0.288] 733 
Education -0.213 [0.213] -0.147 [0.158] 0.029 [0.246] 0.119 [0.201] 733 
Management 
experience 




0.002 [0.094] -0.025 [0.079] -0.148 [0.118] -0.051 [0.101] 733 
      Village leaders (village head) 
Years in office -0.294 [0.644] -0.852 [0.600] -0.179 [0.948] 0.331 [0.917] 726 
age 0.711*** [0.264] 0.336 [0.207] -0.822** [0.346] -0.519* [0.285] 729 
Education -0.305* [0.160] -0.357** [0.147] 0.1 [0.193] 0.236 [0.184] 729 
Management 
experience 




-0.029 [0.085] -0.098 [0.068] -0.016 [0.112] 0.143 [0.095] 729 
Note: 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals 




With regard to non-monetary help, we present ordered probit model coefficients in Table 3.4.  
But those do not measure marginal effect.  We therefore compute the marginal impact of TYPE1 
and TYPE2 on the probabilities that respondents lie in each of the four categories of help (from 0 
to 3), and report these in table 3.5.  In Table 3.4, column 1 reports that there is no evidence type 
1 and type 2 villages are different from type 3 villages when we use the entire sample.  However, 
when we restrict the sample to the South, the likelihood of frequent non-monetary help among 
lineage members is higher in type 1 and type 2 villages than in type 3 villages (Table 3.4 column 
2).  For example, the second panel of Table 3.5 presents that in the south, the possibility of 
frequent non-pecuniary help in all the three types (help is equal to 3) within a lineage is higher in 
types 1 and 2 villages than type 3 villages by, respectively, 7.3 and 6 percent.  The coefficients of 
TYPE1 and TYPE2 even become negative when we restrict the sample to the North (Table 3.4 
column 3).  The D-in-D model indicates that the impact of TYPE1 and TYPE2 are both 
significantly different between the South and the North (Table 3.4 column 4).    
The above evidence indicates that within-lineage reciprocity, both monetary and non-
monetary, is more likely to happen in homogeneous villages than heterogeneous villages.  We 
now explain why this is the case.  Essentially an individual’s lineage is like an organization to 
which he or she belongs and whose members tend to know each other quite well and have 
information about each other’s social and economic activities. The importance of lineage 
organizations grows in the presence of asymmetric information or other market imperfections. 
Such an organization can enforce informal transactions, because it directs both punishment and 
reciprocity at not only individual but also members of his/her group (La Ferrara, 2003).  
Moreover, the enforcement can be better as the size of lineages increases (Pan, 2012).  The 
reciprocity among lineage members can be regarded as a form of implicit contacts, in the sense 
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that “I help you today because I expect you to help me tomorrow” (Posner, 1980).  In a large 
lineage where everyone knows everyone else due to clustering over generations, a deviant may 
be denied future exchanges not only with the victim but also with a lot of other lineage members.  
In other words, the cost of defection potentially rises as the lineage size increases.  Consequently, 
reciprocity will be more frequent in large lineages than small lineages.  Notice that the size of a 
lineage in a homogeneous village, on average, is greater than a lineage in a heterogeneous 
village.  This explains why we see more frequent reciprocity in homogenous villages than in 
heterogeneous villages.   
        To further support this hypothesis, we use the following model to test whether the 
cooperative behavior is more frequent in the largest local lineage than in the other smaller 
lineages in the same village: = + + + 						(3.10) 
where  is help or borrow for individual i in the village j.   is the binary 
variable which is 1 if the individual i  belongs to the largest lineage in the village j.   is the 
same vector of individual characteristics as in model (3.1).   is a vector of village fixed effects.  
The variable of interest for this model is .  We expect that > 0, particularly in 
the South.  We restrict our sample to type 1 villages because the size difference between the 
largest lineage and other lineages is the greatest in type 1 villages.  
The results are presented in Table 3.6.  Columns 1 to 3 report probit coefficients for borrow 
while columns 4 to 6 report ordered probit coefficients for help.  We use the entire sample in 
columns 1 and 4.  Columns 2 and 5 restrict the sample to the respondents from the South of 
China.  Columns 3 and 5 restrict the sample to those from the North of China.  Columns 1 and 4 
demonstrate that belonging to the largest lineage has a positive and significant effect on both 
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monetary and non-monetary help.  When we use the regional subsamples, the coefficient of 
SURNAME is statistically insignificant for the monetary help (column 2 and 3).  However, for 
the non-monetary help, bearing the largest surname has a positive effect in the South and no 
effect in the North (column 5 and 6).  The above results provide evidence that within-lineage 
reciprocity could increase with the sizes of lineages.   
We examine within-lineage reciprocity in different ways.  First we focus on monetary help 
and then on non-pecuniary but time-consuming help.  Both of them are negatively associated 
with lineage-based fragmentation.  This implies that villagers do not treat monetary help and 
non-monetary help differently when it comes to lineage obligations and enforcement.  Table 3.3 
and 4 also reports the coefficients of several interesting individual variables.  First, borrow 
increases with age while help does not.  One explanation is that lending is less likely to happen if 
there is asymmetric information about the riskiness of the borrowers.  Older people are more 
experienced and may have more information about other lineage members.  Hence, they are 
more likely to offer monetary help than younger people.  Non-pecuniary help, on the other hand, 
although consumes time, it is less risky and asymmetric information plays a less important role.  
Second, the coefficients of HHINCOME are not significant for both monetary and non-monetary 
reciprocity within a lineage.  This result implies that it does not seem to be the case that people 
with more monetary budgets also tend to help other lineage members more.  Both borrow and 
help are positively associated with family size.  Due to economies of scale, larger families may 
have more information about other lineage members and have more hands to offer help.   
3.4.3 Inter-lineage relationship 
Next, we use the models (3.1)-(3.4) to test whether homogeneous villages are more willing to 
contribute to public goods than heterogeneous villages.  Table 3.7 presents the results.  The 
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outcome variables are fulfill for columns 1-4, share for columns 5-8 and sgrowth for columns 9-
12. Recall that fulfill is an individual-level outcome variable measuring the respondent’s physical 
contribution to public goods while the other two outcomes are village-level outcomes about the 
share of village budget spent on public goods.   Columns 1-3 use model (3.1); column 4 uses 
model (3.2); columns 5-7 use model (3.3); column 8 uses model (3.4); columns 9-11 use model 
(3.8); and column 12 uses model (3.9).   
Column 1 reports that type 1 villages completed more required unpaid labor days than type 3 
villages by 10 percentage points.  When we restrict the sample to the South, the effect of village 
types is stronger.  Column 2 reports that type 1 and type 2 villages completed more of the 
unpaid-labor-day requirement by, respectively, 16.6 and 15.7 percentage points.  In contrast, 
when the sample is restricted to the North (column 3), there is no evidence that the types of 
villages have an impact on the fulfill outcome.  Column 4 uses the D-in-D model and shows that 
the impact of type 1 and type 2 are statistically significantly larger in the South than in the North.    
Column 5 shows that type 1 and type 2 villages spend more of the village budget on public 
goods than type 3 villages by, respectively, 4.3 and 3.3 percentage points. The estimated 
coefficient of TYPE2 is only marginally significant.  When we use the sample of the South, the 
point estimations of TYPE1 and TYPE2 in column 6 are very close to those derived from the full 
sample.  The coefficient of TYPE1 is statistically significant but the coefficient of TYPE2 is not.  
When we use the sample of the North, neither TYPE1 nor TYPE2 has an impact on village 
spending on public goods.  Column 8 uses the D-in-D model.  The results show that the impacts 
of TYPE1 and TYPE2 are statistically insignificantly different between the South and the North. 
 




Table 3.3: Intra-lineage cooperation 




 (1)all (2)south (3)north (4)D-in-D
Type1 0.064** 0.116** -0.003 0.000 
 
 
[0.032] [0.044] [0.048] 
[0.047] 
Type2 0.051* 0.093** -0.003 -0.01 
 
 
[0.030] [0.040] [0.045] 
[0.048] 
Type1*South    0.104* 
 
 
   
[0.056] 
Type2*South    0.102* 
 
 
   
[0.059] 
Age 0.010** 0.006 0.014* 0.010** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] 
ln(hhincome) -0.015 -0.008 -0.023 -0.015 
 [0.012] [0.016] [0.017] [0.012] 
Hhsize 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 
 [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.005] 
Observations 8,193 4,483 3,710 8,193 
Note: 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1.  Coefficients are marginal probabilities calculated at the means from the probit models.  Robust 
standard errors are in brackets, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the county level.  All specifications include province dummies.  
All individual and village characteristics are included in the regression but not all of them are reported here. We also tried another specification that drops the 






Table 3.4: Intra-lineage cooperation 




 (1)all (2)south (3)north (4) D-in-D
Type1 0.108 0.237* -0.096 -0.101 
 [0.086] [0.121] [0.098] [0.095] 
Type2 0.047 0.197* -0.182* -0.174* 
 [0.079] [0.111] [0.094] [0.092] 
Type1*South    0.346** 
    [0.154] 
Type2*South    0.377** 
    [0.149] 
Age 0.010 0.003 0.020 0.010 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.013] [0.008] 
ln(hhincome) -0.010 -0.015 -0.010 -0.010 
 [0.027] [0.039] [0.035] [0.026] 
Hhsize 0.034*** 0.021 0.052*** 0.035*** 
 [0.012] [0.017] [0.015] [0.012] 
Observations 8,193 4,483 3,710 8,193 
Note: 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1.  Coefficients are based on ordered probit estimates.  Robust standard errors are in brackets, 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the county level.  All specifications include province dummies.  All individual and village 
characteristics are included in the regression but not all of them are reported here. We also tried another specification that drops the three provinces: Chongqing, 





Table 3.5: Magnitude of the effects: help and lineage-based fragmentation 
 
 help
 0 1 2 3
    All     
Type1 -0.026 -0.016 0.009 0.033 
Type2 -0.011 -0.007 0.004 0.014 
    South     
Type1 -0.060** -0.034* 0.021** 0.073* 
Type2 -0.050* -0.028* 0.018* 0.060* 
    North     
Type1 0.021 0.016 -0.009 -0.028 
Type2 0.040* 0.030** -0.017* -0.054* 
    D-in-D     
Type1*South -0.075** -0.057** 0.021*** 0.112** 
Type2*South -0.082*** -0.062** 0.022*** 0.122** 
Note: 
Figures in the table indicate the change in the probability of a respondent giving this value of help associated with the change of TYPE1 (TYPE2) from 0 to 1.  
The estimation is based on the ordered probit model in Table 4.  Help takes values 0, 1, 2 and 3 where a larger number implies more mutual help regardless of the 
types of help.  For example, 0 means that all the three binary help variables are 0s: the respondent answered mutual help in all the three types (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
happened rarely or never; 3, the greatest possible number of help, indicates all the three binary variables take the value of 1: the respondent answered mutual help 





Table 3.6: Intra-lineage cooperation in type 1 villages 
Dependent variable: borrow and help 
 
 
 Borrow  help
 (1)All (2)South (3)North  (4)All (5)South (6)North 
Surname  0.286* 0.248 0.24  0.360** 0.660*** 0.118 
 [0.167] [0.244] [0.235]  [0.169] [0.225] [0.265] 
Age  0.045 0.004 0.123**  0.06 0.072 0.099 
 [0.039] [0.054] [0.057]  [0.047] [0.077] [0.063] 
Marriage  0.1 0.956** -1.062**  -0.256 0.547 -1.263** 
 [0.327] [0.426] [0.524]  [0.333] [0.385] [0.580] 
Cadre   -0.097 -0.430* 0.365  0.288 -0.008 0.656** 
 [0.173] [0.232] [0.317]  [0.184] [0.239] [0.282] 
Education  0.000 0.009 -0.021  -0.04 -0.009 -0.065 
 [0.029] [0.039] [0.047]  [0.027] [0.034] [0.044] 
ln(hhincome)  0.07 0.211 -0.212  -0.007 0.068 -0.082 
 [0.134] [0.183] [0.214]  [0.144] [0.216] [0.176] 
Hhsize  0.082* 0.137** 0.063  0.038 -0.021 0.091 
 [0.049] [0.066] [0.080]  [0.048] [0.070] [0.069] 
Past disaster 0.03 0.072 -0.066  -0.023 -0.098 0.011 
 [0.107] [0.136] [0.178]  [0.093] [0.114] [0.157] 
Observations 904 542 362  993 604 389 
Number of villages 277 168 109  262 159 103 
Note: 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Coefficients are based on probit estimates (borrow) and ordered probit estimates (help).  
Robust standard errors are in brackets, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the village level.  All specifications include 
village dummies.  We also tried another specification that drops the three provinces: Chongqing, Yunnan and Guizhou.  The results are similar.   
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The above evidence indicates that inter-lineage cooperative behavior is more likely to happen 
in homogeneous villages than in heterogeneous villages.  Why does lineage composition matter?  
Alesina et al. (1999) claims ethnic groups can have different preferences even over a seemingly 
neutral public good.  The same argument can be applied to lineage organizations.  According to 
median voter's theorem, if there are many distinct preferences across groups, the chosen type of 
public goods is not preferred by a large fraction of the population (Alesina et al., 1999).  In this 
case, individuals contribute fewer resources to public goods, because a large fraction of their 
resources are used to provide public goods shared with other groups.  In a type 3 village, there 
are lots of small lineages.  Villagers from a type 3 village decrease their contribution for the 
reason that most beneficiaries of the public goods do not belong to their own groups.  This 
explains why homogeneous villages contribute more in public good provision both physically 
and monetarily than heterogeneous villages do. 
        Column 9-12 examine how lineage-based fragmentation affects the change of share from 
1998 to 2002.  As shown in column 9, the increase in the share of village budget that is spent on 
public goods is larger in type 1 villages than type 3 villages by 3.3 percentage points.  When the 
sample is restricted to the South, the impact of village type is even larger.  The share of public 
good spending increases more in type 1 and type 2 villages than in type 3 villages by, 
respectively 5.2 and 3.3 percentage points.  When the sample is restricted to the North, type 1 
and type 2 villages do not differ from type 3 villages in the growth of the share of public goods 
spending.  Column 12 uses the D-in-D model.  The point estimation of 1 ∗  and 2 ∗  are both positive.  However, they are statistically insignificant.  The reason 
perhaps is that the observation is at village level.  Compared to Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, the 
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number of observations in columns 5-12 is much smaller, which may make the estimation less 
precise.   
       The above evidence suggests that from 1998 to 2002, the share of village budget spent on 
public goods increases more in a homogeneous village than in a heterogeneous village.  In 1998, 
the median voters in homogenous and heterogeneous villages may have different opinions about  
the supply of public goods.  The median voters in homogeneous villages support more public 
good provision because lots of beneficiaries are from their own groups.  As China is making 
progress in switching to a democratic electoral process, median voters play more and more 
important roles in village affairs.  So over time, their opinions are better accepted when the 
village committees make decisions about how much to spend on public goods.  Thus, in 2002, 
we observe there is a greater increase in the share of village budget spent on public goods in 
more homogeneous villages 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper studies the relationship between lineage-based fragmentation and villagers’ 
cooperative behavior.  Rural China provides an excellent environment to conduct this study 
because China’s central government arbitrarily grouped adjacent lineages into one administrative 
village during the communization movement.  As a result, some villages are composed of one or 
a few large lineages while the others are composed of a number of small lineages.  The 
exogenously determined lineage composition within a village presents a pseudo experiment of 
lineage-based heterogeneity.   
        Using data from CHIPS 2002, we define three types of villages: types 1-3, which go from 





Table 3.7: Inter-lineage cooperation 
Dependent variables: fulfill, share and sgrowth 
 
 
VARIABLES fulfill Share sgrowth  
 (1)all (2)south (3)north (4)D-in-D (5)all (6)south (7)north (8) D-in-D (9)all (10)south (11)north (12)D-in-D
Type1 0.104** 0.166*** 0.008 -0.077 0.043** 0.043** 0.06 0.060* 0.033* 0.052** 0.015 0.001 
 
 [0.051] [0.059] [0.067] [0.073] [0.017] [0.021] [0.037] [0.032] 
[0.019] [0.024] [0.037] [0.033] 
 
Type2 0.064 0.157*** 0.061 -0.048 0.033* 0.031 0.044 0.047 
0.022 0.033* 0.004 -0.001 
 
 [0.051] [0.054] [0.071] [0.088] [0.018] [0.020] [0.039] [0.035] 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.036] [0.035] 
 
Type1*South    0.275***    -0.027 
   0.049 
 
    [0.098]    [0.036] 
   [0.039] 
 
Type2*South    0.202*    -0.022 
   0.036 
 
    [0.105]    [0.040] 
   [0.039] 
Observations 1,453 947 506 1,453 685 394 291 685 671 389 282 671 
R-squared 0.348 0.437 0.486 0.359 0.165 0.132 0.256 0.166 0.062 0.075 0.113 0.064 
 
Note: 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the 
residuals at the county level. All specifications include province dummies. Individual and village characteristics are not reported. We also tried another 




villages are more likely than those of type 3 to have both within-lineage and across-lineage 
cooperation.  In terms of within-lineage cooperation, we find that both monetary and non-
monetary reciprocity among lineage members are more likely to happen in types 1 and 2 villages 
than type 3 villages.  With regard to across-lineage cooperation, villagers from type 1 and 2 
villages are found to fulfill higher percentage of the requirement of pay-free labor than those 
from type 3 villages.  We also find that types 1 and 2 villages spend more share of village budget 
on public goods than type 3 villages, and the share of public goods in village budget grows faster 
in type 1 villages than type 3 villages from 1998 to 2002.   
        In order to present more robust identification, we utilize the differences in the lineage 
culture between the South and the North of China.  Traditionally, the lineage culture is more 
prevalent in the South than in the North.  Consequently, if the relationship between lineage-based 
heterogeneity and cooperative behavior is causal, we should find the relationship is stronger in 
the South than in the North.  Using a D-in-D model, we find that the impacts of the type 1 and 
type 2 indicators on villagers’ cooperative behavior are indeed significantly greater in the South 
than in the North of China. 10  
        This paper contributes to a large empirical literature on the relationship between 
cooperation and diversity by examining intra-group and inter-group cooperative behavior 
simultaneously.  Our empirical findings suggest that within-group and across-group reciprocity 
are not necessarily negatively correlated.  In other words, in-group trust does not necessarily 
happen at the cost of out-group trust.  The results presented in this paper also provide some 
insights into the role that lineage networks play in the success of economic growth in rural 
China.  Actually, the lineage affiliation can serve as a good substitute to promote intra-lineage 
                                                            
10 except for the outcomes of the share of village budget on public goods and the growth of the share 
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cooperation when there is lack of formal institutions.  Moreover, the existence of large lineages 
may promote rural development because lineage-based homogeneity supports and facilitates 




CHAPTER 4: ASYMMETRIES IN FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS 
4.1 Introduction 
In a model of friendship networks, costly effort by agents yields expected benefits from direct 
and indirect links with other agents.  This model was introduced by Brueckner (2006) and differs 
from the rest of the literature.  It captures the realism involved in creating friendships: the 
relationship between two agents is a probabilistic outcome which depends on the effort incurred 
by both agents.  It is also assumed that the probability of link success between any two 
individuals is independent of the probability of a successful relation between any other pair of 
individuals.  When a friendship link between agents  and  is successful, it provides each of the 
two players benefits associated with this direct link as well as benefits from all the other direct 
links of the other player.  In other words by having a friendship with , player  acquires direct 
link benefits from  as well as indirect benefits of a lesser value from all the other direct links of 
player .  These indirect benefits capture the notion of friends of friends.  
This paper extends the work of Brueckner (2006) by introducing different types of 
asymmetries in the model of friendship networks.  Given the model setup, asymmetries can 
occur either in values or costs or in the network structure itself.  Brueckner himself proposes 
value based asymmetry and network asymmetry but considers only specific examples for both 
types.  In the real world, there is yet another type of asymmetry.  Certain individuals are good at 
social networking while many others are poor at even hosting a holiday party.  This is to say, 
with the same level of effort, the cost of forming friendships is less for certain individuals but 
high for many others.  This idea motivates the analysis of cost based asymmetry.  Since Roy and 
Sarangi (2009) have already examined value based asymmetry, in this paper we first introduce 
cost based asymmetry and then focus on network asymmetry.  Unlike Brueckner (2006) where 
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asymmetries are examined only for very small sets of agents, for both instances we consider the 
general case with  agents. 
We consider individuals’ behavior under different types of asymmetries when determining 
the allocation of resources and the structure of social relationships.  The examination of 
asymmetries is important for two reasons.  First, most economic environments are not 
characterized by homogeneous agents.  Second, they act as a robustness check for results 
obtained in the homogenous model.  Thus, the present extensions could benefit both decisions 
makers and researchers in important areas when they face different occasions. 
Very briefly, the literature in economics on network formation can be divided into two well-
known approaches.  One approach due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) involves costly mutual 
consent in link formation.  This idea is present in the model of friendship networks, since it is 
necessary for both agents to incur costly effort in order to establish a link.  The equilibrium 
concept used in Jackson and Wolinsky however is a non-strategic link based concept called 
pairwise stability.  Pairwise stability requires that no pair of agents who have a link wish to 
delete it and pairs of agents with no links do not wish to add one.  Friendship networks on the 
other hand use Nash equilibrium as the stability concept.  In this sense it is closer to the second 
approach introduced by Bala and Goyal (2000a) where a Nash network consists of all agents 
playing a best response to other linking strategies.  In this framework only the agent initiating a 
link incurs its costs and thus mutual consent is not modeled explicitly.  Note that cost and 
benefits of links in the network in both these approaches are usually exogenously given.11 
                                                            
11 Probabilistic link formation and expected benefits have been analyzed for Nash networks by Bala and Goyal 
(2000b) and Haller and Sarangi (2005).  Bloch and Dutta (2008) also consider stochastic links whose strength 




Our paper extends Brueckner's results for asymmetric situations with a small number of 
agents by allowing for an arbitrary number of finite agents.  Although, Brueckner states that the 
general case cannot be solved, we are able to examine the equilibrium effort levels by looking at 
different partitions of the effort space. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we set up the model and discuss 
the cost asymmetric and structure asymmetric networks. Section 3 offers a summary of our 
results. 
4.2 The model 
In this section, we set up the model of friendship networks presented in Brueckner (2006). Then, 
we introduce different types of asymmetries and provide the results for these cases.  Given 
different types of network structures, we focus on equilibrium effort levels for agents. 
4.2.1 Model setup 
Let = {1,2, . . . , } be the set of agents.  We use ( ) to denote the neighborhood set of agent , 
i.e., ( ) ≡ { 	| 	and	 	are	acquainted}.  Let ∈ [0,+∞) denote the effort expended by agent  
in attempting to establish a friendship link with ∈ ( ).  The probability of friendship between  
and  is a function of the effort of both agents, which is denoted by ( , ). The function  is 
a concave function which satisfies 0 ≤ < 1, and is increasing in both arguments implying > 0 and > 0.  The second partial derivatives of  are assumed to be negative, implying 
< 0 and < 0.  In addition,  is a symmetric function, i.e., , = ( , ).12  
When = = 0, 	 = 0 between   and .  In other words,  and  cannot be friends if both of 
                                                            
12 Hence, , = 2[arctan( + )]/π can be an example of function  that satisfies all the properties stated 
above.   
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them do not spend any effort in establishing the relationship between them.  If ≠ 0 between   
and , then we say  and  are connected. 
Effort is costly for all agents.  The cost of effort exerted by agent  to establish the  
friendship is ( ).  It is assumed  is increasing and strictly convex.  In other words, > 0 
and > 0.  Also, (0) = 0.  Indirect benefits do not require benefits, i.e., the benefits  
acquires from indirect friends are free. Therefore, agent 's effort cost for all her possible 
friendship links is given by ∑ ( )∈ ( ) . 
Next we describe the benefit from friendship.  In this paper, we follow Brueckner (2006) and 
only consider benefits from direct friend and friend's friend.  This is not an uncommon 
assumption in the literature since benefits often vanish according to distance.  To keep the 
problem tractable and focus on asymmetries, it is convenient to assume that benefits stop at a 
length of 2.13  Let > 0 and > 0 denote agent 's benefit from a direct friend  and 's 
direct friend  respectively.  Then, assume > , i.e., the benefit from a direct friendship is 
always greater than the benefit from an indirect friendship.  We also assume that these friendship 
benefits are cumulative.  This is equivalent to saying that agent  can be both a direct and an 
indirect friend of agent , and get benefits from both associations.  The expected benefits from 
friendships can be written as the total benefits minus the costs of effort as shown below, 
= , 	 + ,∈ ( ),			∈ ( ) − ∈ ( ) .										(4.1) 
The first term ,   in (4.1) is the expected benefits of individual  from all her 
direct friendship links.  The second summation combined with ,  captures the expected 
                                                            
13 This allows us to go beyond direct links by considering also indirect links which is important to demonstrate the 
importance of a network. 
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benefits from indirect friendships formed with agent .  The last term on the right hand side of (4.1) gives the cost of effort of agent . 
Agent  has to decide how much effort to devote in establishing a friendship link across 
different agents with whom individual  is acquainted.  Denote individual 's decision vector of 
effort spent across links as strategy .  And  is the strategy profile played by all agents except 
agent . 
Definition 4.2.1  The strategy  is said to be a best response of agent  against the strategy 
profile , if 	 ( , ) ≥ 	 ( , ) for all other feasible . 
Definition 4.2.2  The set of all agent 's best responses to  is denoted by ( ).  A network 
is defined as Nash network if	 ∈ ( ) for each agent  . 
Hence in a Nash network, each agent  chooses optimal effort level , ∈ ( ) to maximize 
her own benefits, given other agents' strategies. 
The first-order condition for the choice of  can be written as 
= , + ,∈ ( ),			 − = 0.										(4.2) 
Equation (4.2) balances the marginal gains of both direct and indirect friendships against the 
marginal cost of effort.   
         Observe that this is a finite game, according to Nash's theorem, the equilibrium exists.  
Note that, for the fully symmetric case, where friendship benefits are uniform across all 
individuals and each person is acquainted with everyone else, we have ≡  and ≡ , for 
all  and , and (4.2)  is reduced to ( , )[ + ( − 2) ( , )] = ( ).										(4.3) 
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Next, we compute the socially optimal effort level.  The social welfare function is given by = ∑ .  According to (1), we have 
= ( ,∈ ( ) + ,∈ ( ),			 − ∈ ( ) )∈ 										(4.4) 
Definition 4.2.3  The network ∗ is said to be efficient if ( ∗) ≥ ( ′)W for any possible 
network structure ′. 
So an efficient network has the maximum social welfare. Following Brueckner (2006), we 
can write the first order conditions for optimal choice as follows, if symmetry is taken into 
account, 2 ( ∗, ∗)[ + 2( − 2) ( ∗, ∗)] = ( ∗),										(4.5) 
where ∗ denotes the socially optimal effort level.  From Proposition 1 (P. 854, Brueckner 
(2006)), we know that a Nash network is not efficient.  People do not expend enough effort in 
forming friendship links. 
Our first result brings out a general property of Nash networks when agents have symmetric 
value and costs: in a non-empty equilibrium, the entire society is connected. 
Proposition 4.2.1  A non-empty Nash network is connected. 
Proof.  First, we assume the opposite is true: a non-empty Nash network is connected.  Let agent 
 be the agent who has the largest number of direct friends,  be one of 's direct friends and  be 
any agent in another partition since the network is not connected.  Then for agent , , + =  where  stands for all of agent 's indirect benefits via .  If agent 
 also spends some small effort  in establishing a relationship with agent  and < , then , < ( , 0).  Moreover, the indirect benefit  can obtain, , is greater than .  
Because  also gets indirect benefit from  besides all of 's indirect benefits via .  
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Hence,	 ( , 0)[ + ] > , + = > ( ).  In other words, for agent 
, spending more effort in establishing friendship with agent 	is profitable.  This indicates that 
the current network is not an equilibrium, which results in a contradiction.  So a Nash network 
must be connected. ∎ 
We will now proceed to introduce different types of asymmetries into the model of friendship 
networks. 
Given the structure of the model setup there can be three possible types of asymmetries: (i) 
value based asymmetry, (ii) cost based asymmetry and (iii) network asymmetry. Brueckner 
(2006) introduces value based asymmetry and calls it the magnetic agent problem.  The magnetic 
agent is simply the agent who offers the highest benefits through a direct or indirect link. 
Brueckner solves this model for the case of 	 = 	3, noting that it is not possible to generalize 
this case further. Roy and Sarangi (2009) revisit this model and provide a solution for the class of 
-regular networks. 
Definition 4.2.4  A network with  agents is said to be -regular if every agent has -direct 
neighbors.  Formally, | ( )| = 	  , where ∈ [2, − 1]. 
Proposition 4.2.2 [Proposition 2, Page 5, Roy and Sarangi (2009)]  Consider the set of m-
regular networks where every agent has access to benefits from the magnetic agent.  Let ̃ > ̂.  
Then non-magnetic agents expend more effort attempting to link with agent 1 than she expends 
attempting to link with them.  The non-magnetic agents expend an intermediate amount of effort 
in linking with one another.  More precisely, 	> 	≥ 	 . 
          In this paper we introduce another type of magnetic agent we label as the cost-magnetic 
agent.  This is the agent who has the lowest connection cost among all agents.  Before allowing 
for  agents, we first discuss the results for the case of 	 = 	3 as Brueckner (2006) does.  We 
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find that the result is consistent with that in Brueckner (2006).  A general solution for  agents 
remains difficult and -regular networks are no longer feasible here. 14  So we restrict our 
analysis to a class of inter-linked stars. 
Definition 4.2.5  A network with  nodes is said to be an inter-linked star with  centers if each 
center has exactly − 1 links to the other agents.  Formally, for each center  , | ( )| = 	 − 1. 
Finally, we consider the case of a knows-everyone agent. This notion has also been 
introduced by Brueckner (2006) and is an asymmetric network situation where there exists an 
agent who is connected to everyone else.  Brueckner shows the outcome in this network for the 
case of = 5 agents.  In this paper we introduce the notion of a modified -regular network and 
characterize the solution of the universe of  agents. 
Definition 4.2.6  A knows-everyone network with  agents is said to be modified -regular if 
every non-attractive agent has  direct neighbors, while the only attractive agent knows 
everyone.  Formally, | ( )| = , where ∈ 	 [2, − 2]; | (1)| = − 1. 
We will start by discussing cost-based asymmetry in the next section. 
4.2.2 Cost asymmetry 
In this section we introduce cost asymmetry by means of the cost-magnetic agent.  To be 
specific, it costs less to connect directly to the cost-magnetic agent than any other agent.  We 
start with the simple case with only three agents, all of whom are connected with each other.  
Without loss of generality, let agent 1 be the cost-magnetic agent, and = 2	or	3 be the other 
two agents.  The cost of linking to a magnetic agent is given by ( ) while the cost of linking 
to a non-magnetic agent is given by the usual ( ), or ( ).  Here 0 < ( ) < ( ) for 
any .  Due to the properties of the cost function it is also the case that ( ) < ′( ) for any .  
                                                            
14 We will discuss this later formally. 
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Assume further that efforts required to establish friendship links are substitutes so that ,  
can be written as + .  Next, define the total effort for each link as follows: ̃ = +  ̂ = 2  
Our question is whether links involving agent 1 are more likely to form and the following 
results can be established. Consistent with the findings of Brueckner (2006), the answer is 
affirmative as shown in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.2.3  Consider the cost-magnetic case with 3 agents, non-magnetic agents expend 
more effort attempting to link with agent 1 than agent 1 expends attempting to link with them. 
More precisely, > > .  The inequality ̃ > ̂ holds. 
Proof.  The first order conditions are as follows: ( ̃)[ + ( ̂)] = ( ),										(4.6) ( ̃)[ + ( ̃)] = ( ),										(4.7) ( ̂)[ + ( ̃)] = ( ).											(4.8) 
(1) Consider first why ̃ ≤ ̂ is not possible. If ̃ < 	 ̂, from (4.6) and  (4.8) we can get ( ̃)[ + ( ̂)] > ( ̂)[ + ( ̃)].  This indicates > .  Since ̃ < ̂, <
. Then if we look at (4.7) and (4.8), ( ) > ( ) > ( ), which is 
equivalent to ( ̃)[ + ( ̃)] > ( ̃)[ + ( ̃)] or ( ̂) > ( ̃).  This is a 
contradiction since the function ′ is decreasing. 
Furthermore, in the equilibrium, ̃ ≠ ̂.  To see why, we first assume ̃ = ̂.  From (4.6) 
and (4.7), it is easy to see > .  But from (4.6) and (4.8), = .  So ̃ ≠ ̂. 
This is a contradiction.  Thus the inequality	 ̃ > ̂ holds in the equilibrium. 
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(2) If ̃ > ̂, from (4.6) and (4.8) we can get ( ̃)[ + ( ̂)] < ( ̂)[ + ( ̃)].  This 
indicates < .  Since ̃ > ̂, >  is true.  In other words, > > .∎ 
In the cost-magnetic case with only 3 agents, the inequality ̃ > ̂, holds implying that direct 
friendships involving agent 1 are more likely to form than direct friendships involving non-
magnetic agents.   
Remark 4.2.1  It is not possible to generalize Proposition 4.2.3 to arbitrary networks. 
 To see why, consider an arbitrary network  with  agents. Let agent  have  neighbors, 
where ∈ [1, − 1].  The first order conditions are as follows: ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̂)] = ( ),																											(4.9) ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̃)] = ( ),																								(4.10) ( ̂) + ( ̃) + ( − 2) ( ̂) = ,										(4.11) or		 ( ̂) + ( − 1) ( ̂) = .																				(4.12) 
Consider the inequality < .  Then using equation (4.9) and (4.10), it is easy to verify 
that the result will depend on the comparison between − 1 and − 1. The same problem 
exists for all the other inequalities.  
Since it is not possible to get a general result for arbitrary networks, we restrict our analysis 
to a special class of networks, inter-linked stars.  Inter-linked stars are possible Nash networks 
structure when the benefit of linking with a non-center agent cannot cover the cost.  However, 
linking with a center is still possible because of the indirect benefits that the center brings.  
Figure 4.1 gives some basic ideas about how inter-linked stars look like, where black dots 
indicate centers. 
We assume one of the centers is the cost-magnetic agent.  Again, let agent 1 be the cost-
magnetic agent and agent 2 be the other centers.  Now	  are the non-center agents.  The cost of 
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linking to a magnetic agent is given by ( ) and ( ) while the cost of linking to a non-
magnetic agent is given by the usual ( ), ( ), ( ) or ( ).  In an inter-linked 
star, there are three effort levels. We define the total effort for each link as follows: 
 
 
                (1) One center                                        (2) Two center                                     (3) Three centers 
Figure 4.1: Inter-linked stars with 7 nodes 
 ̃ = + , 
̅ = + , 
̂ = + . 
Our goal here is to identify sufficient conditions on the effort level given the probability 
function under which a given network can be supported as a Nash equilibrium.  The following 
results are based on different partitions of the space of effort. 
Proposition 4.2.4  Let g be an inter-linked star with  agents and  centers.  In Nash networks, 
when ̃ > ̂, the agent  expends more effort attempting to link with agent 1 than attempting to 
link with 2.  Agent 1 expends less effort in linking with  than agent 2 expends attempting to link 
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with x. More precisely, < <  while  < < .  When ̃ < ̂, the results are 
opposite, i.e., < <  while  < < . 
Proof.  To maintain the importance of the center, we assume 	 < 	 /2.  The first order 
conditions are as follows: ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̂)] = ( ),																																									(4.13) ( ̃)[ + ( − − 1) ( ̃) + ( ̅)] = ( ),										(4.14) ( ̂)[ + ( − − 1) ( ̂) + ( ̅)] = ′( ),											(4.15) ( ̂)[ + ( − 1) ( ̃)] = ( ).																																							(4.16) 
(1) We first examine the case when ̃ > ̂.  Since ̃ > ̂, we can get ( ̃) < ( ̂) and ( − 1) ( ̂) < 	 ( − 1) ( ̃).		So it is easy to obtain ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̂)] <( ̂)[ + ( − 1) ( ̃)], which indicates >  from (4.13) and (4.16). 
Now we establish > .  Assume the opposite is true, ≤  holds.  Then +≤ +  or ̃ ≤ ̂ .  This is a contradiction. 
Since ( − − 1) ( ̂) + ( ̅) > ( − 1) ( ̂), from (4.13) and (4.15) it is easy 
to get ( ) < ( ).  So we obtain > . 
from (4.15) and (4.16), ≤  is not possible.  Otherwise, the assumption ̃ > ̂ 
would be violated.  Therefore, < <  and  < < . 
(2) If ̃ < ̂, then the results are opposite.  We first establish < .  Now ( ̃) > ( ̂) 
and ( − 1) ( ̂) > 	 ( − 1) ( ̃). Thus, ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̂)] >( ̂)[ + ( − 1) ( ̃)], which indicates <  from (4.13) and (4.16). 
Now we establish < .  Assume  ≥  holds.  Then + ≥ +  or ̃ ≥ ̂ .  This is a contradiction. 
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Since ( − − 1) ( ̃) + ( ̅) > ( − 1) ( ̃), from (4.14) and (4.16) it is easy 
to get ( ) > ( ).  So we obtain > . ≤  is not possible.  Otherwise, the assumption ̃ < ̂ would be violated.   
Therefore, when ̃ < ̂,  < <  and  < < . 
(3) in the equilibrium, ̃ ≠ ̂. To see why, we first assume ̃ = ̂.  From (4.14) and (4.15), it 
is easy to see > .  But from (4.13) and (4.16), = .  So ̃ ≠ ̂.  This is a 
contradiction.∎ 
Remark 4.2.2  The cost-magnetic agent may lose importance in a general case with n agents. 
When we consider the general case with  agents, the magnetic agent is not as important as 
in the case with only 3 agents.  Other non-magnetic agents may also be attractive if they have a 
sufficient number of friends.  However, ̃ > ̂ allows us to maintain the importance of the cost-
magnetic agent ensuring the specific ranking of the effort levels shown in the proposition.  Agent 
 are establishing friendship with the centers.  If they have a stronger relationship with the cost-
magnetic agent, then they will spend even more effort into this relationship because the cost-
magnetic agent is easy to get along with.  However, if they don't have such a good relationship 
with the cost-magnetic agent, then the lower link cost is no longer attractive for agent . 
4.2.3 Network asymmetry: the knows-everyone agent 
Brueckner (2006) introduced the knows-everyone problem as another type of asymmetric 
network.  An attractive agent who knows every other agent here reflects asymmetry in network 
structure.  In this problem, one attractive agent is acquainted with the entire universe of agents, 
while other non-attractive agents are each acquainted with only a subset of the non-attractive 
agents.  That means agents have different sets of neighborhoods although the friendship benefits 
are symmetric across individuals.  As before, we will focus only on regular networks and assume 
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that each non attractive agent is linked to the knows-everyone agent and − 1 other agents.  
Note that because of the popularity of the attractive agent, the typical regular network does not 
apply here.  Hence below we introduce the notion of a modified -regular network.  Without 
loss of generality, assume agent 1 is the attractive agent, while  describes other agents.  We 
have two possible effort levels here: ̃ = +  ̂ = 2  
In a modified -regular network, when = − 1, we have a complete network.  When the 
number of agents is even,  can only be an odd number.  For instance, there exist networks with = 7 and = 2, 3, 4, or	5; however when = 8, there is no network for = 4; but it does 
exist for = 3, 5.  Obviously we will only consider situations where the modified -regular 
network exists. 
For example, in Figure 4.2 we illustrate the difference between -regular networks and 
modified -regular networks.  Each network has 6 agents, and every agent is acquainted with 3 
neighbors, except that in a modified m-regular network, agent 1 is acquainted with all other 
agents.
 
Figure 4.2: -regular and modified -regular network with = 6, = 3 
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 ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̂)] = ( ),																											(4.17) ( ̃)[ + ( − 2) ( ̃)] = ( ),																												(4.18) ( ̂)[ + ( ̃) + ( − 2) ( ̂)] = ( ).										(4.19) 
Equations (4.17)-(4.19) are the first order conditions when the number of agents is odd, and ≤ − 2.  Though it is not possible to set up the model when the number of agents is even, we 
can still get a general result for the effort investment regarding the different types of links.  In 
practice, when  is small, the importance of the knows-everyone agent is maintained.  The 
attractive agent, i.e., the knows-every agent provides higher direct and indirect benefits since she 
knows more people.  Intuitively, non-attractive agents have a higher incentive to link with her.  
On the other hand, attractive agent does not get as much as she gives, so she puts the least effort 
in forming relationships.  However, in a general case where each other agent know a certain 
number of neighbors, the importance of the attractive agent is diluted and agents' behavior may 
vary.  The proposition below illustrates the results, which are based on different partitions of the 
space of effort. 
Proposition 4.2.5  Let  be a modified -regular network.  In Nash networks, when ̃ > ̂, the 
non-attractive agents expend more effort attempting to link with agent 1 than agent 1 expends 
attempting to link with them.  The non-attractive agents expend an intermediate amount of effort 
in attempting to link with one another.  That is, < < .  When ̃ > ̂, the results are 
opposite, i.e., > > . 
Proof.   Consider the situation when ̃ > ̂, 
(1)  We will first establish < .  By contradiction, assume ≥ , then ′( ) ≥′( ).  It follows from (4.17) and (4.19), that ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̂)] ≥ 
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( ̃)[ + ( − 2) ( ̃)].  Since ∈ [2, − 2], − 1 < − 2, the only way this 
relationship can hold is ̃ < ̂.  This is a contradiction.  Hence < . 
(2)  Now we establish > .  Again we prove by contradiction. So assume that  ≤	holds.  Then, ′( ) ≥ 	 ′( ).  Then from  (4.17) and (4.19), it follows that ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̂)] ≥ ( ̂)[ + ( ̃) + ( − 2) ( ̂)].  However, given our 
assumptions the reverse of this inequality holds with a strict sign.  This is a contradiction.  
Hence > .  
(3)  Since ̃ > ̂ 	and	 < , it is not possible to have ≥ .  Hence, < . 
Therefore, < <  when ̃ > ̂.  Next, we consider the situation when ̃ < ̂.  From 
(4.17) and (4.19), we get ′( ) > ′( ).  So > .  It is easy to see that > >
. 
Finally, we establish ̃ ≠ ̂ in the equilibrium.  Assume ̃ = ̂.  From (4.18) and (4.19), we 
get > .  From (4.17) and (4.19), we get = .  Hence ̃ ≠ ̂.  This is a contradiction.  
Therefore, in equilibrium, ̃ ≠ ̂. 
Remark 4.2.3  It is not possible to generalize Proposition 2.5 to arbitrary networks. 
Consider an arbitrary network  with  agents.  Agent ∈ \{ } has  neighbors, where ∈ [1, − 2].  Agent 1 of course has − 1 neighbors.  The first order conditions are as 
follows: ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̂)] = ( ),																									(4.20) ( ̃)[ + ( − 1) ( ̃)] = ( ),																												(4.21) ( ̂) + ( ̃) + ( − 2) ( ̂) = .										(4.22) 
Using (4.20) and (21), since − 1 ≥ − 1, it is easy to verify that the inequality >  
holds.  However, from (4.21) and (4.22), since ( ̃) > ( ̂), − 2 > − 2 and ( ̃) < ′( ̂), 
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the inequality >  will depend on the value of parameters.  The same problem exists for 
inequality < .  Thus for an arbitrary network , it is possible to claim that the non-
attractive agent will expend more effort linking to the knows-everyone agent than this agent will 
spend in linking to the non-attractive agents.  It is not possible to establish any other 
relationships between the effort levels without imposing restrictions on the parameters. 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduce the cost-magnetic agent and also extend the knows-everyone agent 
model of Brueckner (2006) by allowing an arbitrary number of agents.  We find that the non-
attractive agents expend more effort attempting to link with the attractive agent than the 
attractive agent expends to link with them for both these types of asymmetries when the total 
effort for link between non-attractive agent and attractive agent is greater than the effort for the 
link between two non-attractive agents.  The paper shows that for an arbitrary network this 
ranking of effort levels depends on the parameter values.  What is interesting is that our results 
are consistent with findings of Brueckner (2006) who only considers a small set of agents as well 
as with Roy and Sarangi (2009) who consider the value magnetic agent problem for regular 
networks.  Thus for asymmetric networks (whether in costs, values, or architectures), the 
equilibrium effort choices regarding the links between different types of agents are robust across 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation contributes to the literature by investigating individuals’ interaction in different 
contexts using social network analysis..  The second chapter studies a setting in which agents 
spend resources in both giving information to and asking information from connections to their 
neighbors.  The third chapter empirically tests how the pattern of village structure, in terms of 
lineage network composition, affects people’s reciprocal behavior.  The last chapter analyzes 
friendship networks.    
        The second chapter generalizes the models of link formation of Rogers (2005) by 
combining the model of asking and the model of giving and allowing that giving and asking 
choices can be made separately and simultaneously by each agent.  We focus on two 
specifications: the concave specification and the linear specification.  Under the concave 
specification, the results show that people usually spend more effort in asking for help from 
those with more information, and spend more effort in offering help to those from whom they 
can receive more information.  A social planner wants people to spend more effort in giving if 
they have better aggregate relationships with others.  If an agent’s direct neighbor benefits more 
from receiving information, then this agent’s effort in asking information from is increasing with 
the effort in giving information to this neighbor.  Then, we turn our attention to the linear case.  
In the linear case, we find people only spend resources in asking because the behavior of giving 
suffers more depreciation.  In both the endowment-attractive and the budget-attractive cases, 
non-attractive agents spend all their resources connecting with the attractive agents.  This 
conclusion is consistent with the finding of Breuckner (2006).  Moreover, in both cases, efficient 
networks coincide with Nash networks. 
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        The second chapter studies the relationship between lineage-based fragmentation and 
villagers’ cooperative behavior.   We find that people of types 1 and 2 villages are more likely 
than those of type 3 to have both within-lineage and across-lineage cooperation.  We also find 
that the share of public goods in village budget grows faster in type 1 villages than type 3 
villages from 1998 to 2002 after a series of political revolution initiated in 1998.  Thus, the 
lineage affiliation can actually serve as a good substitute to promote intra-lineage cooperation 
when there is lack of formal institutions.  Moreover, the existence of large lineages may promote 
rural development because lineage-based homogeneity supports and facilitates public-good 
provision.   
The fourth chapter introduces the cost-magnetic agent and also extend the knows-everyone 
agent model of Brueckner (2006) by allowing an arbitrary number of agents.  We find that the 
non-attractive agents expend more effort attempting to link with the attractive agent than the 
attractive agent expends to link with them for both these types of asymmetries when the total 
effort for link between non-attractive agent and attractive agent is greater than the effort for the 
link between two non-attractive agents.  The chapter shows that for an arbitrary network this 
ranking of effort levels depends on the parameter values.  What is interesting is that our results 
are consistent with findings of Brueckner (2006) who only considers a small set of agents as well 
as with Roy and Sarangi (2009) who consider the value magnetic agent problem for regular 
networks.  Thus for asymmetric networks (whether in costs, values, or architectures), the 
equilibrium effort choices regarding the links between different types of agents are robust across 
the various models. 
In the future, I will address other specifications of the link quality function in the asking and 
giving model.  Another extension may be making people’s giving behavior interdependent.  For 
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example, if one agent refuses to help the other agent, then the other agent’s willingness to offer 
help will be reduced.  The results in the linear case are examined for a simple network with only 
three agents.  Thus another future direction can be based upon examining whether the results still 
hold in a larger universe of agents.  For the empirical study, in the future I will also work on how 
people exhibit reciprocal behavior in the existence of favoritism and peer effect utilizing CHIPS 
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